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Gig-Dependence:
Finding the Real Independent Contractors of
Platform Work
KEITH CUNNINGHAM-PARMETER*
Platforms such as Uber and TaskRabbit avoid employment obligations
by categorizing their workers as “independent contractors.” Declining to
follow overtime, antidiscrimination, and other workplace mandates, these
platforms claim to employ no one. Applied on a grand scale, the entire project of platform labor threatens to destabilize our contemporary understanding of employment law.
But not all platform workers possess the characteristics of genuine independent contractors, as courts first envisioned that category. Judges did
not originally formulate the independent contractor distinction to define the
boundaries of workplace protections; rather, the independent contractor
classification was designed to limit the liability of masters for their servants’
torts. Courts in these early cases identified certain workers—independent
contractors—who possessed the skill, autonomy, and financial strength to
pay for their own tortious misconduct and, accordingly, stand alone in the
marketplace.
Today, when judges evaluate whether gig workers are “independent
contractors,” they should look for the same hallmarks of commercial selfdetermination that originally prompted the independent contractor distinction. Fortunately, a few recent judicial decisions have embraced a simplified
standard—the so-called “ABC test”—to assess whether contemporary workers are bona fide independent contractors. In contrast to more popular tests
that have produced indeterminate results, the ABC standard begins with the
presumption that workers who provide labor to firms are employees. If businesses want to overcome this presumption, they must prove three separate
elements to show that their workers possess the marketplace strength of legitimate independent contractors. By using the ABC test to sort workers
based on their economic autonomy, courts can more effectively distinguish
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INTRODUCTION
Soon there will be an Uber for everything. Need your room cleaned?
Handy has that covered.1 Want your Ikea furniture assembled? TaskRabbit
can help.2 Need somebody to proofread your resume? Amazon Mechanical
Turk has a global army of editors at your disposal. And the workers on these

1. See Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back
to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 509-10 (2016) (discussing the chore platform
Handy).
2. See E. Gary Spitko, A Structural-Purposive Interpretation of “Employment” in
the Platform Economy, 70 FLA. L. REV. 409, 411 (2018) (summarizing the variety of services
available through on-demand platforms).
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apps do more than complete simple, low-skilled tasks. From doctors, to computer programmers, to lawyers, a wide variety of workers can perform ondemand jobs at a moment’s notice.3
The so-called “gig” or “platform” economy has exploded in just a few
years, with recent annual growth exceeding 300 percent.4 Although still relatively small as a share of the overall economy, the sectors that drive platform
work are expected to jump from $15 billion of annual revenue in 2014 to
$335 billion by 2025.5 At first glance, these developments might seem like a
boon to workers. In an era of ongoing social anxiety about wages and employment, platforms appear to give individuals a chance to earn extra money,
while enjoying a high level of independence.6 Recently, though, critics have
challenged this benign image of app work.7 In contrast to the notion that platforms promote worker autonomy, this alternative narrative describes the poor
pay and conditions that come with gig work.8 For instance, various reports
have estimated that Uber drivers earn anywhere from $3.37 to $13.17 per
hour after expenses, while other studies have described gig earnings that fall
well below the minimum wage.9
3. See Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and Labor Law,
51 U.S.F. L. REV. 51, 51-52 (2017) (examining the platform economy’s rapid rate of growth).
4. See Rick Bales, Resurrecting Labor, 77 MD. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2017) (discussing
the relationship between platform work and other forms of precarious employment); V.B. Dubal, Winning the Battle, Losing the War?: Assessing the Impact of Misclassification Litigation
on Workers in the Gig Economy, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 739, 742 (2017) [hereinafter Dubal, Winning the Battle] (outlining the employment-related implications of gig work).
5. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE SHARING ECONOMY 14 (2015),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/74YZ-BKDC]; see also Mark Graham & Mohammad Amir Anwar, Two Models for a Fairer Sharing Economy, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 328, 330 (Nestor M. Davidson et al. eds.,
2018) (discussing growth rates in the “sharing economy”).
6. See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1637 (2017) (examining gig work and narratives of worker
empowerment).
7. See id. at 1630-31 (discussing Uber’s alleged manipulation of passengers and
drivers); Elizabeth C. Tippett & Bridget Schaaff, How Concepcion and Italian Colors Affected
Terms of Service Contracts in the Gig Economy, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 459, 477 (2018)
(summarizing the scholarly criticism of independent contractor designations in the platform
economy).
8. See Arianne Renan Barzilay & Anat Ben-David, Platform Inequality: Gender in
the Gig-Economy, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 393, 402-03 (2017) (comparing the status of platform workers to individuals with more stable forms of employment).
9. See Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig
Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 635, 678-79 (2017) (discussing the
challenge of earning living wages in the gig economy); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Impact
of Emerging Information Technologies on the Employment Relationship: New Gigs for Labor
and Employment Law, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 63, 77 (2017) (examining the hourly pay rates
of on-demand work).
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So, which is it? Does gig work represent a new labor paradigm that enables individuals to earn a living and call their own shots? Or, alternatively,
do platforms utilize clever branding to mask underlying forms of worker mistreatment? Over the last several years, scholars and judges have engaged in
heated exchanges on these topics.10 Ultimately, these debates have centered
on the paradigmatic employment law question of whether gig workers are
“employees” or “independent contractors.”11 American law treats employment status as an either-or proposition. Much like the on-off switch of a
smartphone, the law groups most workers either as “employees” who enjoy
workplace rights, or as “independent contractors” who must fend for themselves.12
Courts typically apply some version of two employment standards—the
“economic realities” test or the “common law/agency” standard—to determine whether platform workers are independent contractors.13 Unfortunately
for gig workers, these tests typically yield inconclusive results.14 Today, a
decade since Uber’s founding,15 judges still cannot answer the foundational
question of whether Uber drivers are employees.16 Scholars blame this indeterminacy on the inherent ambiguities or obsolescence of these tests.17 For
10. See V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism of Legal
Worker Identities, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 76-80 (2017) [hereinafter Dubal, Wage Slave] (noting that scholars disagree about whether courts can ever coherently distinguish between different types of platform workers); Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV.
87, 91 (2016) (characterizing the academic debates over the platform economy as “schismatic”).
11. See Martin H. Malin, Protecting Platform Workers in the Gig Economy: Look to
the FTC, 51 IND. L. REV. 377, 379 (2018) (analogizing gig workers to franchisees).
12. See Deepa Das Acevedo, Unbundling Freedom in the Sharing Economy, 91 S.
CAL. L. REV. 793, 799-80 (2018) (explaining how courts utilize employee status to determine
the reach of numerous workplace protections).
13. See Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker
Classification Fights, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 121-22 (2018) (summarizing the primary tests used to determine employee status).
14. See Mathew T. Bodie, Lessons from the Dramatists Guild for the Platform Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 17, 28-29 (2017) (examining the judicial confusion over gigworker classifications).
15. See Miguel Helft, How Travis Kalanick Is Building the Ultimate Transportation
Machine, FORBES (Dec. 14, 2016, 11:20 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/miguelhelft/2016/12/14/how-travis-kalanick-is-building-the-ultimate-transportation-machine
[https://perma.cc/7HCV-RFCD] (discussing Uber’s growth).
16. Compare Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *19
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) (granting Uber’s motion for summary judgment on the question of
whether UberBLACK drivers are employees), with O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp.
3d 1133, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (ruling against Uber’s motion for summary judgment on the
issue of employee misclassification).
17. See Dubal, Wage Slave, supra note 10, at 72-77 (summarizing the widespread
agreement among commentators about the indeterminacy of contemporary employee standards).
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example, deriving from master-servant law, today’s agency test seems like
an outdated way to determine the fate of Uber drivers, Handy cleaners, and
TaskRabbit taskers.18
This Article explains how courts can reinvigorate existing employment
standards by returning to the animating principles that initially caused courts
to distinguish between “servants” (i.e., “employees”) and “independent contractors.” Judges first formulated this distinction not as a means for determining employment coverage, but rather as a method for limiting the liability of
masters for their workers’ tortious misconduct.19 In essence, courts in these
early cases identified a class of workers—independent contractors—who
possessed the skill, autonomy, and financial strength to pay for their own
torts and, accordingly, stand alone in the marketplace.20
Today, when judges evaluate whether gig workers are independent contractors, they should look for the same hallmarks of commercial self-determination that originally prompted courts to create the servant/independent
contractor distinction. Just as the independent contractors of agency law had
the financial fortitude to pay for their own torts, the “independent contractors” of the gig economy should possess analogous skill and financial autonomy. Returning to these first principles will require judges to reorient the list
of factors currently used to evaluate employee status. Fortunately, a few recent judicial decisions have charted a course going forward.21 Led by the
California Supreme Court, these courts have embraced a simplified standard—the so-called “ABC test”—to determine whether contemporary workers are genuine independent contractors.22 Rather than engage in the standard
practice of multifactored balancing—a process guaranteed to yield muddled
results—the ABC test begins with the presumption that most workers who

18. See Mathew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 661, 662 (2013) (discussing the origins of the common law’s control test).
19. See MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 136-43 (1989) (summarizing the historical development of the
doctrine of vicarious employer liability); Charles W. Pierson, A Recent Attempt to Limit the
Independent Contractor Doctrine, 8 YALE L.J. 63, 64 (1898) (discussing the history of the
independent contractor distinction).
20. See generally James de Haan, The Über-Union: Re-Thinking Collective Bargaining for the Gig Economy, 12 CHARLESTON L. REV. 97, 103 (2017) (examining the economic
self-sufficiency of independent contractors).
21. See Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the
Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U.
PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 53, 83-85 (2015) (discussing various judicial applications of the ABC
test for employment).
22. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 8-9 (Cal. 2018)
(adopting the ABC test to consider the employment status of delivery drivers); see also Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 465 (N.J. 2015) (extending the ABC test to state wage
claims).
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provide labor to firms are employees. If firms want to overcome this presumption, they must prove three separate elements to establish that their
workers possess the marketplace strength of legitimate independent contractors.23
Explaining how the ABC test can focus judicial attention on the first
principles of the independent contractor distinction, this Article establishes a
framework for assessing the status of platform workers. Part I of the Article
summarizes the two dominant views of gig work: from entrepreneurial endeavor to vehicle for worker exploitation. The Article explains how recent
judicial decisions on gig employment reflect these differing views. Part II
examines how courts first used the independent contractor designation to
identify workers who possessed a high level of skill and commercial autonomy. A search for these same characteristics can help contemporary courts
distinguish between employees and bona fide independent contractors. Part
III explains how the ABC test represents the most practical method for gauging the financial self-determination of gig workers. The Article concludes by
discussing the test’s relationship to existing standards and by anticipating
several objections to the proposal.
The platform economy has ushered in a new era of worker precarity.
Although various forms of insecure employment existed long before gig
work, the wholesale categorization of platform workers as independent contractors threatens to dramatically widen the chasm between employees with
rights and workers who have none.24 By embracing the ABC test as an effective method for identifying bona fide independent contractors, courts can
bring much-needed clarity to contemporary debates over the status of gig
workers.
I. DIFFERING ASSESSMENTS OF PLATFORM WORK IN THE LAW
Does Uber represent a paradigm shift in the relationship between workers and firms? On one hand, the ride-hailing app’s decision to characterize
its drivers as “independent contractors” seems like just another example of

23. See John A. Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, The Future of Independent Contractors
and Their Status as Non-Employees: Moving on from a Common Law Standard, 14 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 1, 27-28 (2018) (summarizing the ABC test).
24. See Bales, supra note 4, at 16-17 (explaining how gig work has accelerated the
erosion of workplace rights).
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the U.S. labor market’s ongoing shift toward precarious work arrangements.25 For example, firms today often avoid calling their workers “employees,” instead labeling them “freelancers” or “on-call workers.”26 If on-demand work simply represents a continuation of this pattern, then existing legal tests should be capable of ferreting out instances of employee misclassification in the gig economy. After all, ten to thirty percent of employers already misclassify their employees by designating them as “independent contractors” when they are not.27 Given the widespread nature of the problem in
other industries, courts might already possess the tools to assess allegations
of employee misclassification in the platform economy.28 The solution, according to this view, is simply to clarify and enforce existing standards.
But there is also a competing view that on-demand labor represents a
fundamental change in the nature of work. Uber and other platforms claim
that they are “technology companies” that do not employ the workers who
perform their services.29 If true, then gig work raises unique employment issues that might require distinct legal treatment. This section evaluates these
two views of platform work and considers how legislatures and courts have
reached vastly different answers to these questions. As explained below, to
break this stalemate, judges cannot robotically apply prevailing employment
tests. Ultimately, to effectively distinguish app employees from bona fide
independent contractors, contemporary courts must ask the same question
that initially sparked the independent contractor designation: Do today’s “independent contractors” possess sufficient skill and economic autonomy to
stand alone in the marketplace?

25. See Lobel, supra note 10, at 131 (examining the expansion of contingent work
arrangements).
26. LAWRENCE F. KATZ & ALAN B. KRUEGER, THE RISE AND NATURE OF
ALTERNATIVE WORK ARRANGEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1995-2015 1, 7 (2016),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w22667.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XDX-CTRT] (discussing the
growth of alternative worker designations in the U.S. labor force).
27. See SARAH LEBERSTEIN & CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS, INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR VS. EMPLOYEE: WHY MISCLASSIFICATION MATTERS AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO
STOP IT 4 (2016); Pearce & Silva, supra note 23, at 14 (summarizing employment misclassification studies).
28. See Bodie, supra note 14, at 27-28 (citing various examples of individuals who
maintain an ambiguous employment relationship with the firms that hire them).
29. See Julia Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The Postindustrial Corporation and Advanced Information Technology, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 13 n.85 (2016)
[hereinafter Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm?] (outlining Uber’s claim that it does
not provide transportation services).
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A. APP WORK AND THE GROWTH OF RIGHTS INEQUALITY

More and more Americans work without the protections of basic employment rights.30 Since at least the 1970s, U.S. companies have responded
to post-industrialization by disclaiming their status as employers.31 Because
employment rights such as overtime and antidiscrimination protections attach only to “employees,” firms have offloaded these responsibilities to third
parties (e.g., subcontractors and employment agencies) and to the workers
themselves as “independent contractors.”32 The results of this decades-long
project are striking. From 2005 to 2015, nearly all new net job growth came
from “alternative work arrangements” (temp workers, on-call workers, contract workers, and freelancers).33
Although scholars and commentators have paid critical attention to the
problem of income inequality in the United States, the growing disparity between workers with and without employment rights has garnered far less notice.34 Yet the two problems are interrelated. Because independent contractors receive fewer economic guarantees from firms (e.g., overtime, minimum
wages, health insurance, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation),
the growth of independent contractor classifications necessarily erodes basic
income protections as well.35 As such, the dividing line between the “haves”
and “have nots” in the labor market not only groups people by income and
wealth, but also by the level of workplace protections that they enjoy.
Enter platform work. The “gig” or “platform” economy refers to marketplaces that utilize web-connected technologies to link customers and suppliers on a large, disaggregated scale.36 Not every transaction that occurs
30. See Julia Tomassetti, The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the Collapse of
the Means/Ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S.C. L. REV. 315, 358 (2014) [hereinafter Tomassetti, Contracting/Producing Ambiguity] (discussing the contention that employment laws
have failed to keep pace with post-industrial work).
31. See Dubal, Winning the Battle, supra note 4, at 749-50 (examining restructured
workplace relationships).
32. See Bales, supra note 4, at 16-17 (discussing the growth of contingent work arrangements).
33. KATZ & KRUEGER, supra note 26, at 7 (“A striking implication of these estimates
is that all of the net employment growth in the U.S. economy from 2005 to 2015 appears to
have occurred in alternative work arrangements.”).
34. See generally Noah D. Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment
Law, in THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA’S
LABOR MARKET 31 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008) (calling for increased critical attention to the problem of rights inequality); Tomassetti, Contracting/Producing Ambiguity, supra
note 30, at 357 (discussing the misalignment of law and work).
35. See Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1514-15 (2016) (discussing the economic rights of employees).
36. See Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the
Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543, 1572-73 (2018) (distinguishing between different sectors within the gig economy).
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through these marketplaces raises employment law issues. For example,
when parties sell or lease assets (e.g., Airbnb), no obvious employment relationship arises because the transactions do not primarily involve an exchange
of capital and labor.37 As such, the employment law issues created by the
platform economy involve a subset of firms that market labor-intensive services to customers.38 The gig sectors that most clearly raise workplace issues
include transportation and delivery (e.g., Uber, Lyft, Amazon Flex, Grubhub,
etc.), chores and housework (e.g., TaskRabbit, Handy, etc.), and crowdwork
(e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk, Upwork, Freelancer, etc.).39
Given that most platforms designate their service providers as “independent contractors,”40 critics claim that gig work represents just another example of the labor market’s downward slide toward unstable work.41 Indeed,
despite marketing campaigns that tout the high wages and freedom of ondemand work, emerging evidence on gig labor has highlighted the precarious
nature of certain forms of platform work.42 For instance, the lack of decent
pay remains a constant problem in this sector.43 The gig economy’s typical
payment structure, which compensates workers by the job, rather than by the
hour, has yielded sub-minimum wages for some workers.44 For example, one
on-demand driver in California alleged that he earned $2.64 per hour while

37. See id. (discussing various forms of platform-based transactions).
38. See Das Acevedo, supra note 12, at 806 (utilizing the term “platform” to refer to
service-related transactions in the “sharing economy”).
39. See Graham & Anwar, supra note 5, at 330 (discussing various subcategories of
platform work).
40. See generally Erez Aloni, Capturing Excess in the On-Demand Economy, 39 U.
HAW. L. REV. 315, 336-37 (2017) (outlining the savings that gig firms enjoy by classifying
workers as independent contractors); Dubal, Winning the Battle, supra note 4, at 741 (noting
that venture capitalists have invested billions of dollars in the independent contractor business
model of the gig economy); Cynthia Estlund, Who Mops the Floors at the Fortune 500? Corporate Self-Regulation and the Low-Wage Workplace, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 671, 680
(2008) (describing varying levels of employment compliance among firms within the same
industry). But see Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 9, at 684 (listing several platforms that have
classified their workers as employees).
41. See generally Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 9, at 638-39 (discussing the casualized
nature of modern work); Dubal, Winning the Battle, supra note 4, at 751-52 (arguing that
platforms “build upon and exacerbate the prevalence of the fissured workplace”); see also The
Aspen Inst. Future of Work Initiative & Cornell Univ. Sch. of Indus. & Labor Relations, What
Is the Future of Gig Work?, GIG ECONOMY DATA HUB, https://www.gigeconomydata.org/basics/what-future-gig-work [https://perma.cc/U5PJ-4H8Q] (situating platform work within the
framework of larger economic trends).
42. See Oei, supra note 13, at 109 (explaining how platforms emphasize the high
level of independence that workers enjoy).
43. See Cherry & Aloisi, supra note 9, at 678-79 (discussing the conditions of platform work).
44. See id. (examining the low pay that comes with certain on-demand jobs).
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working for Uber and Lyft, while another Amazon Turker reportedly earned
$1.94 per hour for labeling images online.45
In addition to minimum wage problems, overtime compensation is unheard of in the industry. Thus, even though on-demand firms create incentives for individuals to work longer hours—Lyft rewards its “Power Drivers”
who work more and Uber utilizes behavioral science to motivate workers to
drive longer—individuals who work more than forty hours per week do not
receive overtime.46 Adding to the financial precarity of gig work, platforms
that utilize the “independent contractor” designation do not contribute to Social Security, Medicare, or unemployment insurance.47 Likewise, the independent contractors of the gig economy have no federal right to employersponsored healthcare.48
Beyond the lack of benefits and wage protections associated with gig
labor, most workplace antidiscrimination protections do not apply to independent contractors.49 This coverage gap is especially alarming given that
customers can provide biased reviews, which may ultimately lead to discharge (i.e., “deactivation”). The customer rating systems that platforms typically use have no obvious mechanism for rooting out reviewers’ discriminatory animus based on race, gender, sexual orientation, disability, religion, or

45. See LEBERSTEIN & RUCKELSHAUS, supra note 27, at 3; Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond
Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577,
601-02 (2016) (discussing the experience of an Amazon Turker who received five cents for
every fifty-five clicks of labeled images).
46. See Aloni, supra note 40, at 351 (examining schedule-based incentives in the gig
economy); Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User Expectations, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 23 (2018) (explaining how Uber encourages “goal achievement” among drivers).
47. See Richard R. Carlson, Employment by Design: Employees, Independent Contractors and the Theory of the Firm, 71 ARK. L. REV. 127, 131 (2018) [hereinafter Carlson,
Employment by Design] (discussing the tax consequences of platform employment); Paul M.
Secunda, Uber Retirement, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 435, 448 (2017) (same).
48. See Maryalene LaPonsie, 5 Companies That Offer Benefits to Gig Workers, U.S.
NEWS MONEY (Aug. 23, 2018, 12:01 PM), https://money.usnews.com/careers/salaries-andbenefits/articles/2018-08-23/5-companies-that-offer-benefits-to-gig-workers[https://perma.cc/U9B9-FWCY]; see also Lydia DePillis, Gig Economy Workers Need
Benefits. These Companies Are Popping up to Help, CNN BUS. (Aug. 23, 2018, 7:41 AM),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/08/23/technology/gig-economy-worker-benefits/index.html
[https://perma.cc/R7HR-DFVJ] (discussing gig workers and employment benefits).
49. See Frank J. Menetrez, Employee Status and the Concept of Control in Federal
Employment Discrimination Law, 63 SMU L. REV. 137, 143-44 (2010) (outlining coverage
issues under federal antidiscrimination protections).
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other protected characteristics.50 Because nearly all workplace antidiscrimination protections exclude independent contractors from coverage, platform
workers cannot claim these rights even when customers give them poor reviews based on conscious or unconscious biases.51
Despite the shortcomings of platform labor, however, many individuals
still expose themselves to the risks and rewards that come with this type of
work. For instance, Gallup estimates that thirty-six percent of U.S. workers
“have a gig work arrangement in some capacity.”52 In contrast to the typical
image of on-demand workers who earn extra cash through “side hustles,”
many gig laborers bet their livelihoods on this type of work.53 For example,
roughly one quarter of gig workers generate seventy-five percent of their
earnings from platform labor.54 Surveys of Uber drivers have shown that
forty percent have no other job and/or rely on the platform for their primary
income.55 In New York City, nearly two-thirds of Uber drivers work for the
platform on a full-time basis.56
Given the various instances of personal and financial exposure that
come with gig work, the question remains what role, if any, employment law
should play in regulating these interactions. Critics charge that platforms
have illegitimately “hacked” workplace protections.57 But gig firms assert
that the old rules of employment law simply do not apply to this emerging
sector. Highlighting the autonomy and entrepreneurship that come with on50. See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 6, at 1627 (examining problems of unconscious
bias in the gig economy); Miriam A. Cherry, Are Uber and Transportation Network Companies the Future of Transportation (Law) and Employment (Law)?, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 173,
191 (2017) (same).
51. See Menetrez, supra note 49, at 143-44 (discussing the exclusion of independent
contractors from workplace protections).
52. Shane McFeely & Ryan Pendell, What Workplace Leaders Can Learn from the
Real Gig Economy, GALLUP (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.gallup.com/workplace/240929/workplace-leaders-learn-real-gig-economy.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9AGNQ5DF].
53. See Alex Kirven, Comment, Whose Gig Is It Anyway? Technological Change,
Workplace Control and Supervision, and Workers’ Rights in the Gig Economy, 89 U. COLO.
L. REV. 249, 263 (2018) (examining platform workers’ earnings).
54. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 23, at 30-31 (explaining how some workers rely
on platform-generated income, while others do not).
55. See Aloni, supra note 40, at 326 (discussing varying levels of dependence on
platform work).
56. See William B. Gould IV, Dynamex Is Dynamite, but Epic Systems Is Its Foil—
Chamber of Commerce: The Sleeper in the Trilogy, 83 MO. L. REV. 989, 996 (2019) (examining worker reliance on gig-generated income).
57. See Charlotte S. Alexander & Elizabeth Tippett, The Hacking of Employment
Law, 82 MO. L. REV. 973, 977 (2017) (distinguishing between various forms of regulatory
hacks, only some of which technically violate the law); Tippett & Schaaff, supra note 7, at
462; see also Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 6, at 1645-46 (discussing the assertion made by
critics that platforms engage in “regulatory arbitrage”).
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demand work, they disclaim sharing any sort of employment relationship
with individuals who work through their apps.58 Before examining how legislatures and courts have responded to these assertions, this popular claim of
platform exceptionalism must first be explored.
B. BEYOND THE REACH OF EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE LANGUAGE OF
PLATFORM EXCEPTIONALISM

Platforms argue that just as their business models differ from legacy
companies, their relationships with workers differ as well. Bolstering their
public image as innocuous go-betweens, platforms have adopted branding
strategies that characterize on-demand firms as “intermediaries,” rather than
as “employers.” By emphasizing the neutrality and dynamism of gig work,
this linguistic tactic helps build public support for a certain policy response
that this Article calls “platform exceptionalism”—the notion that the distinctive nature of on-demand work warrants distinct legal treatment.59
Rather than “employ” individuals, on-demand companies claim to act
as intermediaries that connect customers to independent service providers.60
Much like a credit-card processer that neutrally facilitates transactions, most
platforms disclaim employment-related obligations to workers.61 For example, the on-demand meal company Grubhub has denied its status as a “food
delivery service,” instead claiming that it is a “technology company that connects restaurants with independent delivery partners . . . .”62 Grubhub calls
drivers “Delivery Service Provider[s]” who operate their own “independent
business of providing delivery services.”63 Similarly, Lyft says that it provides “software” to customers, and Uber claims that it is a “technology company” that provides “referral service[s]” to drivers so that they can find

58. See Dubal, Winning the Battle, supra note 4, at 741-43 (exploring the “independent contractor business models” of on-demand firms).
59. See Julia Tomassetti, Digital Platform Work as Interactive Service Work, 22 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 2-3 (2018) (examining the relationship between the rhetoric of gig
firms and public policy outcomes).
60. See SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KRUEGER, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR
LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE “INDEPENDENT WORKER” 6 (2015) (listing
several on-demand companies that act as intermediaries between buyers and sellers).
61. See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 6, at 1637 (examining how platforms emphasize the freedom and flexibility that they offer to workers). But see NAT’L EMP’T L. PROJECT,
EMPLOYERS IN THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY 1 (2016) (listing platforms such as Instacart that
classify their workers as employees).
62. See Oei, supra note 13, at 127 (critiquing the rhetoric used to describe gig transactions).
63. Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d. 1071, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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“leads” or “users.”64 Uber’s contract with drivers helps reinforce this narrative: “You acknowledge and agree that Company is a technology service provider that does not provide transportation services.”65
Beyond transportation and delivery, other on-demand sectors also utilize stylized language to deemphasize the underlying labor that workers exert. Consider, for example, Amazon Mechanical Turk, the so-called “online
marketplace for work.”66 The platform allows subscribing parties to post projects to its website (e.g., photo tagging, completing surveys, computer programming, etc.) that contain their own performance deadlines and compensation rates.67 Those who post projects are called “requesters” and the individuals who ultimately perform the work are known as “contributors” or
“Turkers.”68 Amazon Mechanical Turk, like most platforms, omits the word
“employee” from its terms of service.69 Likewise, TaskRabbit’s user agreement labels workers as “taskers” and states in all caps: “COMPANY DOES
NOT PERFORM TASKS AND DOES NOT EMPLOY INDIVIDUALS TO
PERFORM TASKS.”70 Embracing analogous phrasing, Handy calls its home
cleaners “independent [p]rofessionals” and states that “Handy is not the employer of any Professional.”71
Even the terms “platform” and “gig” deemphasize the labor involved in
these transactions. Whereas observers can spot the inaccuracy of older terminology like the “sharing economy”72 (i.e., there is very little “sharing” that
actually occurs in the “sharing economy”), more recent terms such as “platform” and “gig” also minimize the role that the firms play in structuring their
64. See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 6, at 1637 (analyzing Uber’s linguistic choices).
65. Technology Services Agreement, RASIER, LLC (Dec. 11, 2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/uber-regulatory-documents/country/united_states/RASIER%20Technology%20Services%20Agreement%20Decmeber%2010%2
02015.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDA8-ZT7J].
66. See Alexander & Tippett, supra note 57, at 1003-04 (discussing the functions of
Amazon Mechanical Turk).
67. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 9, at 76 (outlining various forms of crowdsourced
work).
68. See Elizabeth Tippett, Employee Classification in the United States, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 291, 299 (Nestor M. Davidson et al. eds., 2018) (examining how rating systems affect worker retention in the platform
economy); Alexander & Tippett, supra note 57, at 1003-04 (summarizing the terminology
used by Amazon Mechanical Turk).
69. See generally Secunda, supra note 47, at 436 (outlining independent contractor
designations in the gig economy).
70. TaskRabbit Terms of Service, TASKRABBIT (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.taskrabbit.com/terms [https://perma.cc/5G7L-HEBK].
71. Terms of Use/User Agreement, HANDY (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.handy.com/terms
[https://perma.cc/D7SL-GVN5].
72. See Lobel, supra note 10, at 105 (outlining certain critiques of “sharing” terminology in the gig economy).
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relationship with workers. A “platform” is a passive agent that merely facilitates transactions between customers and service providers.73 Rather than
hire or fire workers, “platforms” quietly operate in the background. Similarly, terms such as “gigs,” “tasks,” and “rides” obscure the work that individuals perform or the role that employment law should play in regulating
this work.74
While gig firms downplay the role of labor in the platform economy,
other variants of “gig talk” call attention to the freedom and flexibility that
individuals enjoy.75 According to this frame, the “micro-earners” of the platform economy take advantage of underutilized time to earn discretionary income that can supplement existing revenue streams.76 These self-directed gig
workers choose how much to work and when to work. By interfering with
the exceptional freedom that these entrepreneurs enjoy, workplace protections seem to unduly disrupt their autonomy.
According to the language of platform exceptionalism, labor laws not
only intrude on the individualism of entrepreneurs, they undermine benefits
to the public as well. As disrupters of entrenched business interests, platforms
claim to increase efficiencies through peer-to-peer transactions that eliminate
bloated corporate monopolies.77 Utilizing technological advances to harness
excess capacity, on-demand companies claim to offer superior services at
lower prices, as compared to legacy firms. This “win-win” not only helps
sellers monetize available labor, but also helps consumers engage in trustbased transactions with strangers who willingly provide needed services.78
By emphasizing the connectivity that platforms harness, this narrative creates
little space for regulatory interventions that might undermine the value of
gig-based transactions.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the two narratives of gig
work—one based in worker abuse and one based in individual autonomy—
give rise to two very different views about how the law should deal with this

73. See Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm?, supra note 29, at 34 (examining
how the “idiom of technology” deemphasizes the role that labor plays in platform work).
74. See Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time Workforce”: On-Demand
Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig-Economy,” 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y
J. 471, 477-78 (2016) (noting the absence of terms like “labor” and “worker” in discussions
about the gig economy).
75. See Oei, supra note 13, at 126 (explaining how “gig talk” speaks “directly to
many of the current legal ambiguities confronting this new sector”).
76. See Aloni, supra note 40, at 321-22 (discussing the connection between platform
rhetoric and public policy).
77. See Lobel, supra note 3, at 52-53 (examining the possible efficiencies of platform
transactions).
78. See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 6, at 1635-37 (discussing the values of freedom
and flexibility that platforms espouse).
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emerging sector of the workforce. Should courts curb instances of mistreatment by extending employment rights to gig workers? Or is platform work
so categorically unique that workplace protections will hamper ongoing innovations? As the next section discusses, the responses from legislatures and
courts have swung wildly between these two poles. This indeterminacy underscores the need for a coherent framework that can effectively evaluate the
status of platform workers.
C. TWO VIEWS OF APP WORK BY LEGISLATURES AND COURTS

Gig workers have not shied away from suing platforms for allegedly
misclassifying them as independent contractors. Uber drivers have filed at
least twenty-eight federal class actions and over ten thousand arbitration demands.79 Although claims against other platforms have generated less attention, workers have sued Grubhub, Lyft, Postmates, and Washio, while
Handy, DoorDash, and Caviar have arbitrated misclassification claims.80 Despite the proliferation of such cases, however, the employment status of gig
workers remains unsettled.81
Commentators have blamed this indeterminacy on the deficiencies of
existing employment standards.82 As noted above, courts use two primary
tests—the common law/agency standard and the economic realities test—to
define employment.83 Varying somewhat by jurisdiction, each standard contains a range of nonbinding factors that courts balance at their discretion.84
79. See Michael J. Bologna, New Wage Payment Class Actions Filed Against Uber,
BNA—LAB. REL. WK. (June 29, 2017), https://convergenceapi.bna.com/ContentItem/ArticlePublic/245076480000000197/303068?ReportGuid=57E36B2B-FA4E-420D-8F4C708F9ACD0EB7?emailaddress=libraryer@winston.com [https://perma.cc/E5LZ-V573]; Charlotte Garden, Uber and Lyft Drivers Turn the Tables on Individual Arbitration, ON LAB. (Jan.
8, 2019), https://onlabor.org/uber-and-lyft-drivers-turn-the-tables-on-individual-arbitration
[https://perma.cc/ME9C-RLPT]; see also Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm?, supra
note 29, at 3-4 (examining the legal identity of on-demand drivers in misclassification litigation).
80. See Bodie, supra note 14, at 18 (recognizing the unresolved nature of employment
classifications in the gig economy); Lobel, supra note 3, at 60 (discussing various misclassification cases involving platforms).
81. See Dubal, Winning the Battle, supra note 4, at 757-58 (outlining the ambiguous
relationship between gig work and employee status).
82. See Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer out of Employment Law? Accountability for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 216-17 (2011) (discussing the scholarly criticism of various employment
standards); see also Tomassetti, Contracting/Producing Ambiguity, supra note 30, at 335
(summarizing critiques of the common law test and economic realities standard).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14; Alexander & Tippett, supra note 57,
at 1008 (discussing the role that an employer’s control over workers plays in each analysis).
84. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1992) (summarizing various articulations of the common law standard); Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of Labor
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Although the two tests differ in name and statutory origin, judges frequently
confuse the tests by intermingling certain factors, while ignoring others.85 In
the wake of various attempts by judges to apply these standards to gig workers, two trends have emerged. During the early years of gig-worker litigation,
courts generally rejected the rhetoric of platform exceptionalism and ruled
against on-demand firms. More recently, however, other judges have embraced the language of autonomy and entrepreneurship that platforms espouse. This section considers each trend in turn.
1. Judicial Skepticism of Gig Workers as Independent Contractors
Platforms did not fare particularly well when workers first sued them
for misclassification.86 During this early round of cases, courts generally rejected the common claims made by on-demand firms that they were “software companies” rather than providers of underlying services.87 For example,
in O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., a federal court in California dismissed
Uber’s assertion that the platform “owns no vehicles” and “employs no drivers.”88 In ruling against the ride-hailing firm, the O’Connor court found that
Uber dictated drivers’ pay, held them to detailed requirements, and controlled
their work performance.89
Uber’s competitor, Lyft, also lost an early misclassification decision in
Cotter v. Lyft,90 when a federal court characterized as “obviously wrong”
Lyft’s assertion that it was “merely a platform, and that drivers perform[ed]
no service for Lyft.”91 But even though it rebuffed Lyft’s attempt to disclaim
its role as a transportation provider, the Cotter court acknowledged the high
level of freedom that drivers enjoyed: “Lyft drivers can work as little or as
much as they want, and can schedule their driving around their other activities.”92 On balance, though, the Cotter court held that this freedom did not
v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987) (listing economic realities factors); see also
Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y
J. 187, 207-08 (1999) (critiquing the judicial application of economic realities factors).
85. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees
One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 326-29 (2001)
(describing the overlap in factors between the common law and economic realities tests).
86. See Lobel, supra note 3, at 58-60 (noting that early classification decisions tended
to side with gig workers).
87. See Cherry, supra note 50, at 182 (explaining how courts have identified the “central role” that transportation plays in the business models of ride-hailing apps).
88. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (summarizing Uber’s assertion that the company does not employ its drivers).
89. Id. at 1151-52.
90. Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
91. Id. at 1078.
92. Id. at 1069.

2019]

GIG-DEPENDENCE

395

automatically transform Lyft drivers into independent contractors. Finding
that Lyft controlled drivers’ earnings and threatened drivers with “deactivation,” the court allowed the plaintiffs’ overtime and minimum wage claims
to proceed.93
In addition to O’Connor and Cotter—the two most significant defeats
that platforms suffered during the initial phase of misclassification litigation—Uber lost various rulings at the state administrative level. For instance,
California’s Labor Commissioner rejected Uber’s contention that the platform merely mediated transactions between peers: “Defendants hold themselves out as nothing more than a neutral technological platform, designed
simply to enable drivers and passengers to transact the business of transportation. The reality, however, is that Defendants are involved in every aspect
of the operation.”94 Echoing this sentiment, the Oregon Bureau of Labor and
Industries found that Uber drivers were employees because the platform unilaterally established fares and monitored drivers’ performance, among other
factors.95
In sum, during the first wave of claims brought against gig companies,
decisionmakers declined to embrace the rhetoric of platform exceptionalism.
Instead, these decisions focused on the practical forms of control that ondemand transportation companies retained over drivers. But even then, ridehailing apps were able to limit the fallout from their judicial losses: Uber’s
dispute with California drivers in O’Connor went to arbitration96 and Lyft
settled the Cotter case before any court ruled definitively on the drivers’ status.97 Nevertheless, the overall significance of these decisions, combined
with losses at the state administrative level, signaled a shift toward workers
and against platforms.98 In contrast to these early developments, however,
more recent judicial decisions have begun to embrace the language of platform exceptionalism and the idea that employment protections have no place
in the gig economy.

93. Id. at 1079.
94. Order, Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at *6
(Cal. Labor Comm’r June 3, 2015).
95. The Employment Status of Uber Drivers, Advisory Opinion (Or. Bureau of Labor
& Indus. Oct. 14, 2015).
96. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 836 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2016), superseded by 848
F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Oei, supra note 13, at 130-31 (discussing Uber and Lyft
litigation).
97. See Oei, supra note 13, at 130 (summarizing the $27 million settlement that Lyft
reached with California drivers in 2017).
98. See Secunda, supra note 47, at 450 (discussing losses by Uber at the national and
international levels).
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2. Independence Returns: Courts and Legislatures Embrace Autonomy Narrative
The misclassification litigation landscape for platforms has improved
dramatically in recent years. In contrast to earlier decisions, these more recent determinations have emphasized the individualism and self-determination that come with platform work.
Uber won its largest misclassification victory to date when a federal
court in Pennsylvania recently ruled in favor of the platform.99 The plaintiffs
in Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc.100 drove for UberBLACK, the platform’s
limousine service. Reviewing the drivers’ claims for unpaid overtime and
minimum wages, the Razak court noted that Uber was “greatly popular with
consumers.”101 Echoing the language of platform exceptionalism and the
need for courts to tread lightly in the evolving world of on-demand labor, the
Razak court explained how Uber represented “a novel form of business that
did not exist at all ten years ago . . . .”102 Intermingling the vernacular of
technology, independence, and opportunity, the court referred to the “[i]ndependent transportation companies” that the plaintiffs had created and explained how those firms entered into “Software License and Online Service
Agreement[s]” with Uber.103 Although the Razak decision acknowledged that
Uber provided more than just “software” to drivers, the opinion still used
technology-focused terms to describe the company: “Uber’s drivers depend
on Uber’s technology in getting jobs.”104 Highlighting the extreme freedoms
that the limousine drivers enjoyed while using Uber’s software, the court declined to categorize the platform as an employer.105
In addition to successfully disclaiming wage-related responsibilities in
Razak, Uber has attempted to deny unemployment benefits to drivers as well.
This campaign has yielded mixed results. For example, a New York unemployment insurance board recently ruled against the platform, holding that
“Uber exercised sufficient supervision, direction, and control . . . such that
an employer-employee relationship was created.”106 In contrast, a Florida
court ruled in favor of the ride-hailing company, finding that “Uber is a tech99. Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., CV 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
11, 2018) (noting that the decision was the first to grant summary judgment against UberBLACK drivers).
100. Id.
101. Id. at *13 n.17.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *5.
104. Razak, 2018 WL 1744467, at *19.
105. Id.
106. In re [Redacted], ALJ Case No. 016-23858, at 9, 10 (N.Y. Unemployment Insurance App. Board June 9, 2017).
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nology platform that connects drivers with paying customers seeking transportation services.”107 Echoing the language of platform exceptionalism, the
Florida court marveled at the “transformative nature of the internet and
smartphones” and explained how Uber provided users with “transportation
network software.”108 Given the freedom that Uber’s technology afforded to
drivers, the Florida court declined to hold Uber responsible for its drivers’
unemployment benefits.109
This recent spate of victories has extended beyond the ride-hailing sector. In Lawson v. Grubhub, a driver unsuccessfully attempted to collect overtime from the meal delivery platform Grubhub. Adopting the vernacular of
platform exceptionalism, the Lawson court described Grubhub as “an internet
restaurant ordering platform that connects diners with participating restaurants.”110 The court discussed the freedoms that come with gig work, noting
that the plaintiff in the case had previously worked for Lyft, Uber, Postmates,
and Caviar: “He drove for these companies, including Grubhub, because the
flexible scheduling allowed him to pursue his acting career.”111 Indeed, the
court anchored its independent contractor determination in the autonomy of
platform work: “Grubhub could not make him work and could not count on
him to work.”112 Outlining Grubhub’s status as a “platform” and the driver’s
overall freedom, the Lawson court rejected the plaintiff’s wage claims.113
Whereas judges in misclassification litigation have differed on whether
workers enjoy genuine freedom in the gig economy, state legislatures have
more consistently embraced the concept of platform exceptionalism. Apart
from a few instances of protective legislation in cities like New York, which
established a minimum hourly wage of $17.22 for on-demand drivers,114 and
Seattle, which attempted to extend unionization rights to the same group,115
most new regulations involving gig workers have hewed closely to the industry’s autonomy narrative. For instance, twenty-five state legislatures have

107. McGillis v. Dept. of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 221 (Fla. 3d Dist. App.
2017); see also Cherry, supra note 50, at 189 (discussing different outcomes in unemployment
compensation determinations).
108. McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 226.
109. Id.
110. Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
111. Id. at 1073-74.
112. Id. at 1085.
113. Id. at 1093.
114. See Ginia Bellafante, Uber and the False Hopes of the Sharing Economy, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/nyregion/uber-nyc-vote-driversride-sharing.html [https://perma.cc/YW5M-LK8C] (examining the conditions of platform
work).
115. See Gould, supra note 56, at 997-98 (discussing the efforts by Seattle and New
York City to extend rights to platform drivers).
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passed laws that treat on-demand drivers as nonemployees.116 Conversely, no
state has extended full employment rights to platform workers.117
In enacting legislation that excludes on-demand drivers from standard
workplace protections, lawmakers have spoken about the freedom and opportunity that come with gig work. For example, when Florida passed Uberbacked legislation that denied drivers employment rights, one lawmaker said
that the law helped drivers “make their own choices about employment.”118
Another Florida representative pointed to the “strong desire for this innovative and free-market service,” which provided drivers with “an extra source
of income to help make ends meet.”119 In Ohio, Uber championed the bipartisan passage of a bill that denied employment rights to drivers by saying,
“[D]river-partners can continue to benefit from the flexible income-earning
opportunities they enjoy on the Uber platform.”120 And in Alaska, after the
state enacted pro-Uber legislation, one representative said, “Drivers can work
when, where[,] and how they want, which is why it makes sense to allow
them to work as independent contractors.”121 In these and other instances,
legislatures have rushed to pass laws that emphasize the autonomy of gig
work, thereby creating a separate legal space for platform workers that exists
beyond the reach of workplace protections.122

116. See JOY BORKHOLDER ET AL., UBER STATE INTERFERENCE: HOW TRANSPORTATION
NETWORK COMPANIES BUY, BULLY, AND BAMBOOZLE THEIR WAY TO DEREGULATION 13
(2018) (summarizing legislative changes affecting transportation network companies such as
Uber).
117. See Dubal, Winning the Battle, supra note 4, at 754-55 (examining legislative
trends that favor companies in the gig economy).
118. See Heather Sommerville & Dan Levine, U.S. States Pass Laws Backing Uber’s
View of Drivers as Contractors, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-statelaws-idUSKBN0TT2MZ20151210 [https://perma.cc/KDA7-Z4PW] (discussing gig worker legislation).
119. See Florida House, Senate Pass Rideshare Legislation with Overwhelming Support,
FLA. TREND (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.floridatrend.com/article/21980/florida-house-senatepass-rideshare-legislation-with-overwhelming-support [https://perma.cc/W5CG-QPRK] (summarizing bipartisan support of legislation regulating transportation platforms).
120. See Fatima Hussein, Uber, Lyft Will Be Regulated in Ohio, CIN. ENQUIRER (Dec. 23,
2015), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/money/2015/12/23/uber-lyft-regulated-ohio/77825012/
[https://perma.cc/CP3L-9BMR] (defining a transportation network company as a service that “relies on software to connect passengers to rides”).
121. See Suzanne Downing, Ridesharing Bill Passes, Making Way for Uber, Lyft,
MUST READ ALASKA (May 17, 2017), http://mustreadalaska.com/ridesharing-bill-passes-uberlyft/ [https://perma.cc/7N8V-CKUZ]; see also Dubal, Winning the Battle, supra note 4, at 756
(discussing how Alaska exempted on-demand transportation companies from workers’ compensation regulations).
122. See Dubal, Winning the Battle, supra note 4, at 756-57 (explaining how legislative developments have put increased pressure on misclassification cases to address gig-workplace problems).
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II. VICARIOUS LIABILITY: ORIGINS OF THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
EXCLUSION
In the midst of sharp disagreements over the status of gig workers—
with some courts focusing on worker exploitation and other judges and legislators embracing the idea of platform exceptionalism—misclassification
litigation continues to proliferate throughout the country.123 But despite the
confusion over the issue, judges in these cases agree on three basic ground
rules. First, to claim nearly any employment right, gig workers must prove
that they are “employees” and not “independent contractors.”124 Second, absent some contrary statutory directive, courts use the common law understanding of “employee” to categorize workers.125 And third, the common law
distinction between “employees” and “independent contractors,” derives
from master-servant law and the notion that masters historically assumed vicarious responsibility for the torts of certain workers, but not for others.126
Despite widespread acknowledgment of the relationship between vicarious liability and today’s definition of “employee,” however, the connection
between the two doctrines remains surprisingly undertheorized. Although
scholars have recognized the existence of a direct, lineal path from masterservant law, to vicarious liability, to today’s common law definition of “employee,” they point out that each doctrine serves vastly different goals.127 Although contemporary employment protections set minimum labor standards
for workers, vicarious liability serves the distinct objective of allocating tortbased obligations to third parties.128 According to the critique, courts developed the independent contractor distinction to limit employers’ vicarious liability, whereas legislatures enacted modern workplace protections to expand employers’ responsibilities to workers.129 Given these disparate goals,
123. See Lobel, supra note 3, at 58-59 (summarizing the range of misclassification
claims brought against platforms).
124. See HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 60, at 7 (discussing the protections that come
with employee status).
125. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1992).
126. See generally id. at 322-23 (“[W]hen Congress has used the term ‘employee’
without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional
master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.”).
127. See, e.g., Jooho Lee, The Entrepreneurial Responsibilities Test, 92 TUL. L. REV.
777, 789-90 (2018) (arguing that the goals of workplace regulations are “too attenuated to
justify the control test as an appropriate rule for determining employee status”); Pearce &
Silva, supra note 23, at 9-10 (considering the purpose behind workplace protections and the
agency test for employment).
128. See Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as Price-Takers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
105, 123 (2018) (summarizing the scholarly critique of the relationship between contemporary
employment definitions and vicarious liability).
129. See LINDER, supra note 19, at 135 (criticizing the application of agency law’s
independent contractor distinction to modern workplace protections).
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it makes little sense for courts to utilize the same definition of “employee”
and “independent contractor” in each instance.
But the apparent incongruity between the doctrine of vicarious liability
and today’s workplace protections should not preclude courts from considering the qualities that originally defined the class of workers known as “independent contractors.” Given that today’s common law definition of “independent contractor” originated from the doctrine of vicarious liability, judges
in misclassification litigation ought to consider the rationales that first motivated courts to develop the independent contractor label. In fact, a deeper
explanation of these motivations reveals that the animating principles of this
exception to vicarious employer liability better align with contemporary
workplace policies than critics suggest.
When judges first devised the modern rules for holding employers vicariously liable for their workers’ acts, they separated employees (i.e., “servants”) from independent contractors as a means to ensure that the public
could turn to financially secure parties to recover damages.130 Unlike servants, who depended on their masters to pay for the costs of their misconduct,
independent contractors constituted a class of financially stable workers who
could compensate third parties for tort-related harm.131 In other words, independent contractors possessed enough skill, freedom, and financial might to
compensate outsiders without requiring the assistance of the masters who retained their services. By examining the goals of public compensation and risk
prevention that gave rise to this rule of agency law, contemporary courts can
reorient existing employment standards to more effectively distinguish between the contractors and “servants” of gig work.
A. ENSURING PUBLIC COMPENSATION THROUGH VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Courts have long held masters liable for certain wrongs committed by
their servants. Despite this history, however, scholars disagree about the precise origins of the contemporary doctrine of vicarious employer liability.132
Whereas some writers trace these rules to Germanic or Roman traditions that
held masters liable for the acts of their servants, other scholars question these

130. See id. (discussing the relationship between employment status and a tortfeasor’s
ability to pay judgments).
131. See Agnieszka A. McPeak, Regulating Ridesharing Platforms Through Tort Law,
39 U. HAW. L. REV. 357, 375 (2017) (listing several principles associated with the vicarious
liability doctrine, including cost allocation and corrective justice).
132. See generally H. Beau Baez III, Volunteers, Victims, and Vicarious Liability: Why
Tort Law Should Recognize Altruism, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 221, 225-32 (2009); Martha
Chamallas, Two Very Different Stories: Vicarious Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law, 75
OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1332 (2014) (discussing the debate among scholars over the history of
respondeat superior).
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sources.133 Notwithstanding disputes over this early history, however, a consensus view holds that today’s definition of employment stems most directly
from the master-servant law of pre-industrial England.134
During this period, judges did not always broadly define masters’ liability. In fact, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, English
courts limited the legal responsibility of masters to third parties.135 For example, the 1685 King’s Bench decision of Kingston v. Booth stated, “[I]f I
command my servant to do what is lawful, and he misbehave himself . . . I
shall not answer for my servant, but my servant for himself . . . .”136 But in
the years to come, as the practical distance between masters and servants
grew with the increasing complexity of work, English courts began to hold
businesses to higher standards for their servants’ misconduct.137
Legal observers took note of the radical eighteenth-century shift from
the notion that masters should pay only for the harms that they sanctioned to
the much more expansive idea that they should pay for damages that resulted
from their servants’ unauthorized acts.138 Ever since that time, scholars have

133. See Barbara Black, Application of Respondeat Superior Principles to Securities
Fraud Claims Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 24
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 825, 856 n.33 (1984) (summarizing the scholarly dispute over the origins of the vicarious liability doctrine); O. W. Holmes, Jr., Agency I, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345,
355 (1891); Pierson, supra note 19, at 64 (outlining the history of vicarious employer liability);
John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 330
(1894) (connecting the doctrine of vicarious liability to earlier trends).
134. See Bodie, supra note 18, at 663 (discussing the connection between master-servant law and the contemporary common law test for employment); Fowler V. Harper, The Basis
of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent Contractor, 10 IND. L.J. 494, 495 (1935)
(outlining the historical development of respondeat superior); Lee, supra note 127, at 786-87
(examining the relationship between master-servant law, vicarious liability, and today’s common law definition of employment).
135. See John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History - II, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 383, 392 (1894) (summarizing the historical development of vicarious liability).
136. Kingston v. Booth, 90 Eng. Rep. 105, 105 (1683); O. Kahn-Freund, Servants and
Independent Contractors, 14 MOD. L. REV. 504, 505 (1951); Jesse Andrews Raymond,
Agent’s Liability to Third Persons for Nonfeasance, 9 TEX. L. REV. 224, 226 (1931) (discussing the historical expansion of a master’s liability for his servants’ torts).
137. See Wigmore, supra note 135, at 394 (noting that it took “a century or more” for
this branch of vicarious liability to develop); see also Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee
Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 96 (1984) (discussing
the historical origins of vicarious employer liability).
138. See generally Harper, supra note 134, at 495; Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 106-07 (1916) (arguing that judges failed to justify this
shift in the law); see also Dowd, supra note 137, at 97-99 (discussing the expansion of vicarious employer liability).
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tried to articulate a satisfying rationale for the common law’s movement toward strict employer liability.139 Many of these justifications centered on a
wide-ranging notion of employer responsibility. Lord Brougham, for instance, said, “[B]y employing him, I [the master] set the whole thing in motion; and what he does, being done for my benefit, and under my direction, I
am responsible for the consequences of doing it.”140 According to this rationale, the law held masters responsible for their servants’ misconduct because masters hired servants and controlled the details of the servants’
work.141 Indeed, today’s common law test for employment embraces this
same notion of control to distinguish between employees and independent
contractors.142
But a rationale rooted in employer responsibility fails to demonstrate
why courts held masters vicariously liable—as opposed to directly liable—
for their servants’ misconduct. If, as the justification goes, the law held masters liable due to the high level of control that they exercised over servants,
then this liability derived from a presumption that masters contributed in
some way to the wrongs of their servants. For example, given his control over
his servant, the master could have prevented injuries by restraining his servant’s negligent acts.143 Even though the master was not directly at fault for
committing the tort himself, his control over the interaction gave rise to some
level of undetectable contributory fault.144 But whether the law attributed the
master’s liability to his error in controlling his servant’s work or because of
his failure to prevent harm, the “employer responsibility” rationale blamed
the master for playing some role in the misconduct.
Despite the prevalence of these accounts, however, the foregoing faultbased explanations ignored the vicarious nature of vicarious liability. If the
master became liable because his control over an interaction increased the

139. See generally Laski, supra note 138, at 109-11 (criticizing certain explanations
that experts have given to justify the doctrine of vicarious liability); Glanville Williams, Vicarious Liability and the Master’s Indemnity, 20 MOD. L. REV. 220, 228-35 (1957) (summarizing various rationales for vicarious employer liability).
140. Duncan v. Findlater, 7 Eng. Rep. 934, 940 (1839); see also Laski, supra note 138,
at 109 (evaluating discussions of vicarious liability in early case law).
141. See Dowd, supra note 137, at 98-99 (discussing the rationale for linking control
to vicarious employer liability).
142. See id. at 100-01 (summarizing the common view that the power of control gave
employers the “means to control . . . liability”).
143. See generally Clarence Morris, Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L.
REV. 339, 340-41 (1934) (explaining how the doctrine of respondeat superior creates incentives for employers to prevent wrongdoing).
144. See Robert Flannigan, Enterprise Control: The Servant-Independent Contractor
Distinction, 37 U. TORONTO L.J. 25, 35 (1987) (outlining the relationship between control and
fault within the doctrine of vicarious employer liability).
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risk of injury, then his liability was primary and direct, not vicarious.145 Likewise, if the law held the master responsible because he could have exercised
control and prevented injuries, then the master’s liability derived from a
measure of blameworthiness on the master’s part.
In sharp contrast to accounts based on culpability, however, the doctrine
of respondeat superior (“let the master answer”) does not focus on the fault
of hiring entities. In fact, this branch of vicarious liability holds employers
(i.e., “masters”) liable for their employees’ (i.e., “servants”) misconduct even
when employers exercise all reasonable care.146 By definition, vicarious liability requires an employer to assume liability for a tortfeasor even though
the employer has not committed any wrongful act.147 As a strict-liability system, respondeat superior demands that firms compensate third parties for
employee-generated harms that occur within the scope of employment despite employers’ best efforts to prevent those harms.148 In fact, the law holds
employers responsible even when they exercise control in a non-negligent
fashion or fail to exercise control at all.149
Whereas the concepts of fault and responsibility fail to justify the doctrine of respondeat superior, the notions of just compensation and risk prevention provide more convincing rationales.150 During the development of
the modern iteration of respondeat superior, the business world was changing from a realm of mostly private transactions to one involving larger commercial enterprises.151 Reacting to this shifting business landscape, the law
began to hold firms to higher obligations as a cost of doing business in the
public sphere.152 The growing economic status of businesses gave rise to a
belief in law that firms should compensate the public for harms that resulted
from business-related transactions, even if firms committed no error.153
But masters were not responsible for the torts committed by all workers
whom they hired. Rather, to ensure third-party compensation, while limiting
145. See id. at 36 (discussing justifications for vicarious employer liability).
146. See Harper, supra note 134, at 496 (explaining how even innocent masters were
responsible for their servants’ torts).
147. See McPeak, supra note 131, at 375 (discussing justifications for the doctrine of
vicarious liability).
148. See id. at 376-77 (noting that an employer’s liability does not extend to frolics
and detours); Morris, supra note 143, at 340 (“[I]t is no defense that the master is blameless.”).
149. See Carlson, Employment by Design supra note 47, at 158-59 (describing the
strict-liability nature of respondeat superior).
150. See Dowd, supra note 137, at 97 (discussing the scholarly disagreement over the
rationales for vicarious employer liability).
151. See id. (examining the justifications for the doctrine of respondeat superior).
152. See id. at 98; Laski, supra note 138, at 111 (explaining how the changing role of
businesses influenced the judicial development of the doctrine of respondeat superior).
153. See Dowd, supra note 137, at 96 (discussing the “revolutionary change in the
liability of employers” that occurred during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
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the overall exposure of hiring entities, English and American courts eventually identified a class of workers—independent contractors—who could bear
these costs on their own.154 As such, the independent contractor designation
constituted an exception to the general rule that masters were responsible for
their workers’ torts—an exception that took decades to develop.155 Throughout this process of identifying the individuals who could pay for their own
misconduct, a worker’s financial self-determination became a key guidepost
for distinguishing between servants and independent contractors. Given the
“general poverty of servants” at the time,156 such workers were more likely
to be judgment-proof than independent contractors.157 In light of this reality,
the law searched for a party who, more probably than not, had the financial
wherewithal to reimburse the public for tort-related damages.
Here, the concepts of control, financial strength, risk prevention, and
public compensation interrelate.158 Courts evaluated a master’s control over
work, not as a mechanism for assessing blameworthiness, but as a method
for ensuring that some party possessed an incentive to reduce threats to third
parties. Judges assigned tort liability to masters who controlled their servants’ work because masters stood in the best position to thwart such misconduct and compensate third parties in the event of damage. Masters could insure against servant-generated harms or pass on these losses to customers
through price adjustments.159 In comparison to masters, the “servant’s financial irresponsibility,”160 did not generate the same incentives to prevent injuries to the public.161 As potentially judgment-proof defendants, servants possessed fewer economic motivations to engage in preventative measures.
154. See id. at 99 (explaining how courts declined to hold firms vicariously liable for
their independent contractors’ torts because they “were independent businessmen”); Flannigan, supra note 144, at 37 (discussing the development of the independent contractor exclusion).
155. See Harper, supra note 134, at 497 (“The principle of respondeat superior had
been thoroughly accepted as law . . . before the insulating concept of independent contractor
was created”); Pierson, supra note 19, at 64 (noting the “recent origin” of the independent
contractor distinction); see also Roscoe T. Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life,
2 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 511 (1935) (linking the growth of independent contractor classifications
to broader economic trends).
156. See Williams, supra note 139, at 221-32 (“[W]e have to admit that vicarious liability owes its explanation, if not its justification, to the search for a solvent defendant.”).
157. See Morris, supra note 143, at 340 (examining the “entrepreneur theory” used by
proponents of respondeat superior to justify the doctrine).
158. See McPeak, supra note 131, at 375-76 (discussing the goals of tort law and vicarious liability).
159. See Morris, supra note 143, at 340-41 (summarizing certain economic justifications for holding masters vicariously liable for their servants’ misconduct).
160. See id. at 341 (considering the role that a worker’s financial capacity plays in
determining vicarious employer liability).
161. See id. at 340 (examining early rationales for the doctrine of respondeat superior).
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Thus, the doctrine of respondeat superior placed the burden of paying for
damages on defendants who had the greater drive to avoid losses, while also
reducing the risk that the public would suffer from non-recovery.162 Justice
Wiles summed up the rationale this way: “[T]here ought to be a remedy
against some person capable of paying damages to those injured . . . .”163
Faced with this choice, judges selected masters and independent contractors
as the superior risk-bearers.164
In contrast to servants, courts did not need to create additional deterrence incentives for independent contractors precisely because of their presumed financial wherewithal. Unlike servants, who retained a functional
ability to discharge their liability to masters, the direct liability of independent contractors encouraged them to avoid harm to the public. This impetus
derived largely from the financial risk that tort liability posed. In essence,
then, courts achieved the goals of public compensation and risk prevention
by ensuring that either masters or independent contractors would compensate
third parties in the end.165
Although many of the formative decisions during this period addressed
the level of control that masters retained over workers, other opinions addressed the independent contractor’s skill and expertise, relative to the entities that hired them.166 Take, for example, Lord Denman’s comments in Allen
v. Hayward.167 There, the court considered whether the law should hold navigation commissioners liable for the negligence of contractors whom the
commissioners had hired to divert creeks. Lord Denman said, “[I]t seems
perfectly clear that in any ordinary case the contractor to do works of this
description is not to be construed as a servant, but a person carrying on an
independent business . . . to perform works which [defendants] could not
execute for themselves.”168 Thus, the more that individuals hired others to
carry out specialized work (i.e., tasks that hiring entities “could not execute

162. See id. (outlining various goals served by holding employers vicariously liable).
163. Limpus v. Gen. Omnibus Co., 158 E.R. 993, 998 (1862); see also Laski, supra
note 138, at 110; Williams, supra note 139, at 232 (describing as “purely cynical” the theory
that masters should pay for the tortious conduct of others because of their financial ability to
do so).
164. See generally Harper, supra note 134, at 496 (outlining various explanations for
vicarious liability).
165. See Morris, supra note 143, at 341-42 (discussing respondeat superior and behavioral incentives).
166. See LINDER, supra note 19, at 134 (examining two trends in the early case law on
vicarious liability, one centered on “skill/integration” and another centered on “physical control”).
167. Allen v. Hayward, 115 Eng. Rep. 749 (1845); LINDER, supra note 19, at 140 (discussing the case).
168. Allen, 115 Eng. Rep. at 755.
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for themselves”), the more likely that the law would hold contractors solely
liable for their own misconduct.
Similarly, in Milligan v. Wedge, a butcher hired a licensed driver to take
a beast to the butcher’s slaughterhouse.169 En route to the slaughterhouse, the
driver acted negligently and the animal “with great violence ran . . . and broke
five chimney pieces . . . .”170 Declining to hold the butcher liable for the damage, Justice Williams assumed that the butcher was not “acquainted with
driving” such an animal, whereas the company that the butcher hired “understands the business” and controls its own servants.171 In light of these factors,
Justice Williams exonerated the butcher, stating that “where the person who
does the injury exercises an independent employment, the party employing
him is clearly not liable.”172
With their proficiency in distinct trades and their lack of integration into
a hiring firm’s primary enterprise, independent contractors possessed marketplace strengths that translated into economic gains.173 The independent
contractor was his “own master” because he could serve multiple clients or
the public at large.174 In sum, the doctrine of respondeat superior did not
apply to independent contractors because the skill and accumulated capital
of this group enabled them to pay for their own torts.175
Just as early courts identified independent contractors who had the financial strength to compensate victims for their own negligent behavior, today’s courts should look for the same characteristics of economic self-reliance in workers. Unfortunately, judges have lost sight of these animating
principles; instead, they have applied the “independent contractor” designation to a broad class of workers who lack genuine economic autonomy.
B. MISMATCH BETWEEN AGENCY GOALS AND CONTEMPORARY
CONTRACTOR DESIGNATIONS

Firms no longer limit the “independent contractor” label to businesspeople who possess independence and financial wherewithal. Whereas the

169. Milligan v. Wedge, 113 Eng. Rep. 993 (1840); LINDER, supra note 19, at 139
(examining the holding).
170. Milligan, 113 Eng. Rep. at 993.
171. Id. at 995.
172. Id.
173. See generally LINDER, supra note 19, at 137 (explaining how independent contractors possessed capital and skills).
174. See Carlson, supra note 85, at 303 (outlining certain characteristics associated
with independent contractors).
175. See LINDER, supra note 19, at 134-35 (asserting that vicarious liability enabled
third parties to seek recovery from the “deep pocket[s]” of employers, instead of seeking recovery from judgment-proof workers).
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public might associate independent contractors with highly qualified freelancers, the reality is that many workers today hold “independent contractor”
designations even though they perform low-skilled tasks.176 Indeed, the expansion of this nonemployee label has birthed an entire sector of “workingclass entrepreneurs” who must pull themselves up by their bootstraps without
the help of workplace rights.177 For example, in the gig economy, many firms
categorize low-wage workers as “independent contractors” by claiming that
they operate their own small businesses.178
But the expansion of the “independent contractor” label to low-paid
work extends far beyond platform work. For example, home healthcare agencies require workers to sign “independent contractor” agreements, even
though they perform the company’s main function of caring for the sick.179
Some restaurants call their servers “independent contractors” and refuse to
pay them overtime.180 Exotic dancers receive “performance fees” as independent contractors, rather than minimum wages.181 Janitors must pay for the
right to clean downtown office buildings.182 And over half of the nation’s
port truckers are misclassified as “independent contractors.”183 This is not the
group of economically self-sufficient workers that originally motivated
courts to create the independent contractor designation.
Today’s legal standard for identifying independent contractors no
longer captures the characteristics that first defined this category of workers.
In the typical misclassification dispute, courts tick off a perfunctory list of
indeterminate factors, balance those factors in light of the circumstances, and
176. See Zatz, supra note 34, at 34 (distinguishing between the assumed traits of independent contractors and the reality of contemporary designations).
177. See Dubal, Wage Slave, supra note 10, at 81-82 (discussing the cultural values
associated with entrepreneurship).
178. See supra Section I.B (examining popular representations of gig workers).
179. See Caitlin Connolly, Independent Contractor Classification in Home Care,
NAT’L EMP’T L. PROJECT (Dec. 13, 2015), https://www.nelp.org/publication/independent-contractor-classification-in-home-care/ [https://perma.cc/QW7Z-3Q7Z].
180. See, e.g., Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1984) (ruling against restaurant on employee misclassification claims); Acosta v. CPS Foods, Ltd., 5:14CV490, 2017 WL
5157238, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2017) (describing how one restaurant contracted with servers to participate in a “table rental program”).
181. See, e.g., Hart v. Rick’s Cabaret Int’l, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d 901, 907-16 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (finding that a club owner “regulated almost every aspect of the dancers’ behavior”);
see also DeGidio v. Crazy Horse Saloon & Rest., Inc., 4:13-CV-02136-BHH, 2017 WL
5624310, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2017) (“Dollhouse does not pay entertainers any wages or
include them on payroll.”).
182. See Micah Prieb Stoltzfus Jost, Note, Independent Contractors, Employees, and
Entrepreneurialism Under the National Labor Relations Act: A Worker-by-Worker Approach,
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311, 314-15 (2011) (discussing the growth of nonemployee designations in certain sectors).
183. See REBECCA SMITH ET AL., THE BIG RIG OVERHAUL 4 (2014) (summarizing misclassification lawsuits involving port trucking).
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decide whether workers are independent contractors or not.184 These factors
not only contradict one another, they often have very little to do with the
realities of modern work. For instance, the common law test for employment
lists the “location of work” and the “method of payment” as relevant factors
for identifying independent contractors.185 But given that gig workers often
receive small payments for completing discrete tasks (“method of payment”)
in multiple venues (“location of work”), such factors no longer indicate
whether individuals possess the high level of economic autonomy that courts
envisioned when they first fashioned the independent contractor exception.
In the end, the vagueness and irrelevance of these factors have led to conflicting decisions and arbitrary results.186 By reformulating employment
standards based on the animating principles of the independent contractor
exclusion, judges can more effectively distinguish between normal platform
employees and bona fide independent contractors.
III. REFORMING EXISTING STANDARDS WITH THE ABC TEST
Courts do not need to invent an entirely new legal test to evaluate the
status of platform workers. In fact, the secret to cracking the code of gig work
lies in an under-appreciated definition of employment that judges began applying to unemployment claims decades ago.187 Soon after Congress enacted
the Social Security Act of 1935, a number of states passed unemployment
compensation laws that contained a three-part definition of “employee.”188
By 1942, a majority of jurisdictions had enacted legislation that created a
“three point exclusionary” definition of employment.189 Today, twenty-seven
states use the so-called “ABC” test to make unemployment and other determinations.190 In contrast to the multifactored balancing of more popular
standards, the ABC test eschews this indeterminacy in favor of a simplified
approach that better assesses the financial self-determination of workers.
184. See generally Dubal, Wage Slave, supra note 10, at 71-75 (discussing the judicial
confusion over contemporary employment tests).
185. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992).
186. See Means & Seiner, supra note 35, at 1518 (outlining the mismatch between
existing employment standards and gig-worker classifications).
187. See Carpet Remnant Warehouse, Inc. v. N.J. Dept. of Labor, 593 A.2d 1177, 1184
(N.J. 1991); Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 21, at 65 n.66 (discussing the ABC test’s
origins).
188. See generally Carpet Remnant Warehouse, Inc., 593 A.2d at 1183-84 (outlining
the historical development of the ABC test); Interpretation of Employment Relationship Under Unemployment Compensation Statutes, 36 ILL. L. REV. 873, 876 (1942) (same).
189. See Interpretation of Employment Relationship Under Unemployment Compensation Statutes, supra note 188, at 876 (providing a state-by-state list of ABC tests).
190. See Sunshine, supra note 128, at 130-31 (noting that some states have applied the
ABC standard to discrete claims or certain industries); see also LEBERSTEIN & RUCKELSHAUS,
supra note 27, at 5 (advocating for adoption of the ABC test).
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Although ABC standards differ by state, a common formulation begins
with the presumption that firms employ the workers whom they hire. A firm
can justify a worker’s nonemployee designation by proving three elements:
(a) the firm has relinquished contractual control over the
worker;
(b) the individual performs work that falls outside of the
firm’s usual business; and
(c) the individual operates a separate, independent business
or trade.191
With its requirement that hiring firms overcome a presumption in favor of
coverage, many employers have had difficulty convincing courts that their
workers possess the economic autonomy of genuine independent contractors.192
A. DYNAMEX AND ABC’S EXPANSION

Despite its apparent simplicity and history, the ABC test has remained
confined mostly to administrative unemployment determinations.193 But several recent legislative and judicial developments have brought renewed attention to the test. For instance, state lawmakers have shown a willingness to
apply the ABC standard to new industries and employment claims.194 On the
judicial front, courts have increasingly applied the ABC standard to claims
that fall outside the realm of unemployment coverage. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently utilized the ABC test to evaluate the alleged wage violations of a delivery company.195 Applying Illinois law, which uses the ABC
standard for wage-deduction claims, the Seventh Circuit noted that the elements of the ABC test are “conjunctive, if [the defendant delivery company]
191. See LEBERSTEIN & RUCKELSHAUS, supra note 27, at 4 (summarizing common features of the ABC test); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 9, at 80 (same).
192. See, e.g., Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 465 (N.J. 2015) (adopting
the ABC test and rejecting an employer’s narrower construction of a state wage law); Sinclair
Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 73 A.3d 1061, 1073 (Me. 2013) (extending
unemployment benefits to bookkeepers and sales staff at a firm, but not to skilled construction
workers); Schaefer v. Job Serv. N.D., 463 N.W.2d 665, 668 (N.D. 1990) (applying the ABC
test and requiring an employer to pay job insurance taxes).
193. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 21, at 73 (noting that no state has
implemented an ABC test that applies universally to all employment claims); Dubal, Wage
Slave, supra note 10, at 75 (stating that jurisdictions have used the ABC test primarily for
determining unemployment eligibility).
194. See Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 21, at 66 (summarizing adoption of
the ABC test by various states).
195. Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2016).
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cannot satisfy just one prong of the test, its couriers must be treated as employees.”196 Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently broadened the
application of the ABC test to cover state wage claims.197 Noting that the
ABC standard “presumes that the claimant is an employee and imposes the
burden to prove otherwise on the employer,” the court found that the ABC
test “provide[s] more predictability” than a multifactored approach.198
Building on these doctrinal developments, the California Supreme
Court recently issued a landmark ruling that could radically reshape gig-work
relationships. In Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court,199 a defendant delivery company operated an on-demand service that allowed companies like Home Depot to quickly retain delivery services on an as-needed
basis.200 Thus, much like ride-hailing apps, the defendant’s business enabled
customers to order delivery services at a moment’s notice. As with gig workers, the plaintiff drivers used their own vehicles and set their own schedules.201
The California Supreme Court commented on the inadequacy of existing employment standards and described the “difficulty that courts in all jurisdictions have experienced in devising an acceptable general test . . . that
properly distinguishes employees from independent contractors . . . .”202 For
decades, judges in California balanced numerous factors to determine
whether workers could recover unpaid wages.203 The Dynamex court lamented how this balancing standard “invariably requires the consideration
and weighing of a significant number of disparate factors on a case-by-case
basis.”204
Rejecting the state’s multifactored approach in favor of the ABC standard, the Dynamex court began its application of the new test by asking a
seemingly straightforward question: Did the couriers perform tasks that fit
within the defendant delivery company’s usual course of business?205 Observing that “Dynamex’s entire business is that of a delivery service,” the
California Supreme Court explained that any single element of the ABC test
“may be independently determinative of the employee or independent contractor question . . . .”206 Although an employer’s failure to prove any part of
196. Id. at 1059.
197. Hargrove, 106 A.3d at 465.
198. Id. at 464.
199. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 8 (Cal. 2018).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 14.
203. See S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 399
(Cal. 1989).
204. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 34.
205. Id. at 41.
206. Id.
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the ABC standard could establish employment liability standing alone, the
Dynamex court nevertheless evaluated a second element of the test by asking
whether workers operated their own “independently established business[es]
. . . .”207 Noting that the drivers performed delivery services only for the defendant and did not retain customers or employees of their own, the California Supreme Court authorized the plaintiffs to pursue their wage claims on a
class-wide basis.208
Dynamex triggered swift and passionate responses from the business
community. For example, the California Chamber of Commerce quickly
complained to the governor and state legislature that Dynamex would have
“far-reaching negative implications for nearly all sectors of the economy.”209
Asking state lawmakers to reverse the decision, the Chamber claimed that
Dynamex’s “one-size fits all policy” ignored the “complexity and nuance of
[independent contracting] arrangements, and the value they bring to California’s economy.”210 In all, legislatures received over six thousand emails from
businesses urging lawmakers to reverse the decision.211
In reaching its unanimous conclusion in Dynamex, the California Supreme Court outlined a relatively straightforward method for navigating
worker misclassification claims in the gig economy. With its three-prong,
element-based approach, the ABC test focuses judicial attention on the same
question that first motivated courts to create the independent contractor exclusion: Do contractors possess genuine economic autonomy? For example,
if individuals exert labor subject to a firm’s retained control (the first prong
of ABC), they will have greater difficulty generating income from unencumbered work on the open market. Similarly, if designated individuals work
within a firm’s ordinary course of business (the second prong of ABC), they
are less likely to possess the financial autonomy of independent contractors
who perform skilled tasks for outside customers. Finally, if workers do not
operate their own separate businesses (the third prong of ABC), they are less
likely to possess the kind of economic strength of bona fide independent contractors who undertake greater entrepreneurial risks. The effectiveness of the
ABC standard, then, lies in its ability to capture the concept of financial selfdetermination with each prong of the test standing alone. In this way, the
207. Id. at 39.
208. Id. at 42.
209. See Letter from Cal. Chamber of Commerce et al., to Governor Edmund G.
Brown, Governor of Cal. & Members of the Cal. State Legislature (June 20, 2018),
http://src.bna.com/zNl [https://perma.cc/TE4D-WDV3].
210. See BEACON ECONOMICS, UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA’S DYNAMEX DECISION 18
(2018) (critiquing Dynamex).
211. See Margot Roosevelt, Are You an Employee or a Contractor? Carpenters, Strippers, and Dog Walkers Now Face That Question, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-dynamex-contractors-20190223-story.html
[https://perma.cc/5KKP-K8SC] (summarizing the reaction to Dynamex).
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Dynamex decision not only extended wage protections to more workers in
the world’s fifth largest economy, it offered other courts a blueprint for making gig-worker determinations going forward.212
1. Engaged in Firm’s Usual Course of Business
In many cases, the simplest route to applying the ABC test to gig work
will begin and end by determining whether the worker’s role fits within the
platform’s usual course of business. The Dynamex court framed the question
by asking whether a putative employee “would ordinarily be viewed by others as working in the hiring entity’s business.”213 The court provided two
examples to illustrate the point, saying that “work-at-home seamstresses” operate within a clothing manufacturer’s usual course of business and that custom cake decorators work within a bakery’s usual course of business.214 Of
course, these are easy examples in which a worker’s services align directly
with an employers’ primary business operations. But as with any employment analysis, the “course of business” inquiry will not always be so clear.
Arguing against application of this prong of the ABC test, a firm might
assert that workers perform outside functions, even if those functions seem
central to the company’s operations. For example, as noted above, on-demand platforms that sell transportation and meal delivery services regularly
argue that they are “technology” companies rather than service providers.215
This confusion over the meaning of “usual course of business” occurred in
the aftermath of Dynamex. Soon after the California Supreme Court announced the decision, a lower state court considered whether a gas station
manager worked within the usual course of business of a gas station.216 The
manager was suing Shell Oil Products (the owner of the gas station) for unpaid wages.217 Applying Dynamex and ruling against the worker, the lower
court found that “Shell was not in the business of operating fueling stations—
it was in the business of owning real estate and fuel.”218 Such arguments do
not differ much from the claims made by on-demand companies that they do
not actually deliver the services that the public associates with those firms.
But any strategy that requires platforms to argue against their own
brands is unlikely to yield long-term success. For example, a California court
rejected as “obviously wrong” Lyft’s contention that it does nothing more
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
2018).
217.
218.

See Gould, supra note 56, at 997-98, 1005 (discussing the impact of Dynamex).
Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 40.
Id. at 40.
See supra Section I.B (discussing the language of platform exceptionalism).
Curry v. Equilon Enters., LLC, 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 314 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.
Id.
Id.
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than provide software to drivers and the public.219 Likewise, a London tribunal expressed indignation at a similar claim made by Uber: “The notion that
Uber in London is a mosaic of 30,000 small businesses linked by a common
‘platform’ is to our minds faintly ridiculous.”220 Given the general skepticism
of such claims, when platforms offer specific services with distinct brands,
the ABC standard makes it difficult to exclude workers who perform those
services.
The more challenging variation of the “course of business” test involves
individuals who do not obviously advance a platform’s primary mission.221
For instance, the chore platform TaskRabbit lists a wide variety of jobs that
its taskers can perform: carpentry, decoration, office administration, shopping, and “waiting in line,” to name a few.222 TaskRabbit is owned by Ikea,
the world’s largest furniture retailer, which now offers TaskRabbit services
(i.e., furniture assembly) to Ikea customers.223 Although the job of putting
together tables and cabinets fits squarely within the firm’s usual course of
business, with such a diverse catalogue of other services, how can courts accurately identify TaskRabbit’s typical operations?
The Dynamex decision provided some guidance on this question. The
California Supreme Court referred to a firm’s “usual course of business,” not
its primary brand. Dynamex described an “outside plumber” and an “outside
electrician” as examples of independent contractors who do not work within
the “usual course of the hiring entity’s business.”224 By contrasting “outside”
work with “usual” work, the court limited nonemployee classifications to
workers who perform outside, isolated jobs on a very limited basis. In other
words, if companies hire individuals to perform tasks that occur regularly
and indefinitely as part of the firm’s normal business activities, those individuals do not work “outside” the firm, but instead engage in “usual” forms
of work. For example, if Uber hires secretarial staff to work at its San Francisco headquarters, those individuals work within Uber’s usual course of
219. Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
220. Aslam & Farrar v. Uber, No. 2202550/2015, at 28 (Emp’t Trib. 2016),
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/aslam-and-farrar-v-uber-reasons20161028.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZUT-9VJN]; see also Charlotte Garden & Joseph E. Slater,
Comments on Restatement of Employment Law (Third), Chapter 1, 21 EMP. RIGHTS & EMP.
POL’Y J. 265, 300 (2017) (discussing the decision).
221. See HARRIS & KRUEGER, supra note 60, at 7 (questioning the ongoing relevance
of a standard that focuses on the integral nature of a worker’s service to a firm).
222. TaskRabbit Support, What Types of Tasks Can I Do as a Tasker?, TASKRABBIT,
https://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/en-us/articles/204411080-What-Types-of-Tasks-Can-I-Doas-a-Tasker- [https://perma.cc/98N9-2Z9K].
223. See Carolyn Said, TaskRabbit Trims Prices in Bid to Find More Clients, S.F. CHRON.
(June 20, 2018, 10:05 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/TaskRabbit-trims-pricesin-bid-to-find-more-13008586.php [https://perma.cc/3BLT-DEL3] (listing various chores that taskers perform).
224. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 37 (Cal. 2018) (emphasis added).
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business, even though Uber is a transportation (or “technology”) company,
and not a secretarial business.
In many cases, the “usual course of business” inquiry will be definitive.
For instance, the drivers of Lyft and the home cleaners of Handy perform
tasks that directly align with the companies’ brands. As such, the ABC standard would almost certainly categorize these workers as employees. But even
individuals who perform non-essential tasks do so within a platform’s usual
course of business if those tasks occur regularly as part of ongoing operations. They are not “outside” workers, as Dynamex described that group.
However, for courts that apply this standard solely to workers who are engaged in a platform’s core functions, other aspects of the ABC standard can
also assess the validity of nonemployee designations.
2. Operating Separate Business
Although the Dynamex court held that the “usual course of business”
analysis could decide certain misclassification disputes standing alone, the
California Supreme Court nevertheless continued its evaluation by asking
whether workers are “customarily engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, or business” of their own.225 According to this prong of the
ABC standard, genuine independent contractors tend to operate separate
companies or engage in distinct trades, whereas employees do not.
At first glance, this “separate business” query seems to resemble the
“economic realities” test that courts use to evaluate workplace claims in other
areas.226 Judges who apply this test describe its broad coverage and ask
whether workers are “economically dependent” on the firms that hired
them.227 According to the economic realities test, if a worker depends economically on a company, then the worker is more likely to be an employee.
Despite the apparent expansiveness of this test, however, scholars have criticized courts for failing to define “economic dependence” or to explain its
relationship to broader remedial statutes.228 Indeed, in a world where workers
piece together various gigs, the concept of “economic dependence” does not
gauge a worker’s self-determination as effectively as ABC’s investigation
225. Id. at 7.
226. See Estlund, supra note 40, at 689 (examining the judicial application of the economic realities test).
227. See Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV.
983, 1009-10 (1999) (discussing the difficulty that judges have with applying the economic
realities test).
228. See generally id. (asserting that economic dependence “factors become an end in
themselves”); Estlund, supra note 40, at 690 (highlighting the tenuous connection between
“economic realities” and underlying statutory authority).
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into a person’s separately established business. After all, on any given day, a
platform worker might drive for Uber, carry food for Grubhub, and deliver
packages for Amazon Flex. Even though such a worker may not depend economically on a single firm, she might not possess the financial autonomy of
a genuine independent contractor.
Recall that courts originally excluded independent contractors from the
doctrine of respondeat superior based on their financial independence. As a
policy matter, judges were concerned with identifying workers who could
compensate third parties without the financial backing of the firms that hired
them.229 In other words, courts based this exception to vicarious liability on
a worker’s relationship to the market (“independence”) rather than on the
worker’s financial relationship to any single firm (“dependence”). Reflecting
these rationales, the ABC test asks whether workers enjoy financial autonomy by operating their own separate businesses.
The Dynamex court noted that operators of separate businesses typically
pay for their own advertising, incorporation, or licensure.230 Likewise, they
offer their services to the public or to multiple clients.231 In addition to developing their own customer base, genuine entrepreneurs attempt to create
unique value in the marketplace through targeted investment, whereas employees simply work longer hours to earn higher wages.232 Distinguishing
normal employees from small business owners, Dynamex cited a Massachusetts decision involving a bicycle courier who worked as an “independent
contractor” for a same-day delivery service.233 The courier did not hold himself out to the public as an independent businessman or advertise; likewise
the courier did not have his own business cards, invoices, or clients.234 In
essence, the bicycle courier was not an independent contractor because he
did not sell his services to the public in a manner that resembled a separate,
independent company.
Without evidence of an individual’s investment in her own distinct business (through advertising, client solicitation, etc.) the typical gig worker

229. See supra Section II.A (examining the animating principles of the independent
contractor exclusion).
230. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 39; see also Kirby of Norwich v. Adm’r Unemployment
Comp. Act, 176 A.3d 1180, 1188 (Conn. 2018) (listing factors related to the ABC test’s “separate business” prong).
231. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 39.
232. See generally Lee, supra note 127, at 811-18 (discussing characteristics of entrepreneurs); Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, The Prism of Entrepreneurship: Creating a New Lens for
Worker Classification, 70 BAYLOR L. REV. 595, 630 (2018) (noting that entrepreneurship often
involves creating new firms).
233. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 39 n.31 (Cal. 2018) (citing Boston Bicycle Couriers, Inc.
v. Deputy Dir. of the Div. of Emp’t & Training, 778 N.E.2d 964, 971 (Mass. App. 2002)).
234. Boston Bicycle Couriers, 778 N.E.2d at 973.
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simply does engage in the same kind of public outreach as independent businesspeople who develop marketplace opportunities. Indeed, on-demand
firms often forbid workers from contacting customers outside of their apps.235
For instance, many platforms require workers to communicate to customers
with software that can detect the presence of the “@” symbol in parties’ messages.236 This monitoring ensures that workers will not circumvent the platform and directly obtain payment from customers.
Just as platform workers do not act like small businesses that connect
directly to customers, the public does not perceive most gig workers as separate companies. For example, Uber passengers do not download the Uber
app to retain the services of small business owners. Instead, they pay Uber to
deliver an efficient overall experience, from the driver-rider match, to screening-out poor drivers, to providing a seamless payment system.237 Far removed from the experience of small business owners, Uber drivers cannot
respond to price signals or evaluate earning opportunities because the Uber
app does not reveal the fare that they will earn or the passenger’s destination
until after the driver has accepted an assignment.238
The Dynamex decision characterized the archetypal independent contractor as “an individual who independently has made the decision to go into
business for himself or herself.”239 Viewed through this lens, the timing of a
person’s decision to engage in platform work can help distinguish bona fide
entrepreneurs from gig workers who simply download an app. Following Dynamex, a lower court in California underscored this point by citing ABC authority from four other states and saying, “The adverb ‘independently’
clearly modifies the word ‘established,’ and must carry the meaning that the
. . . business was established, independently of the employer . . . .”240 Viewed
in this light, the typical gig worker does not first open a small business and
then join a platform to expand that business. For example, most Lyft drivers
235. See Kirven, supra note 53, at 282 (explaining how transportation platforms prevent drivers from contacting customers).
236. See Tippett, supra note 68, at 297 (discussing algorithmic control in the platform
economy).
237. See Lee, supra note 127, at 822-23 (examining the presence of genuine entrepreneurship in app-based work).
238. See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 6, at 1661 (discussing Uber’s policy of “blind
ride acceptance”); Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm?, supra note 29, at 27 (explaining
how the Uber app prevents drivers and passengers from negotiating).
239. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 39 (Cal. 2018) (emphasis added).
240. Garcia v. Border Transp. Group, LLC, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360, 372 (Cal. App. 4th
Dist. 2018) (quoting In re Bargain Busters, Inc., 287 A.2d 554, 559 (Vt. 1972) and citing JSF
Promotions, Inc. v. Adm’r, Unemployment Comp. Act, 828 A.2d 609, 613 (Conn. 2003);
Midwest Property Recovery, Inc. v. Job Serv. of N.D., 475 N.W.2d 918, 924 (N.D. 1991);
McGuire v. Dept. of Emp’t Sec., 768 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
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do not own separate transportation companies and most Grubhub drivers do
not operate their own food delivery businesses.241 But in other instances, certain on-demand workers may actually engage with platforms to advance their
own companies. For example, TaskRabbit allows carpenters and electricians
to use its platform.242 For these workers, the TaskRabbit app may simply
generate new leads for their existing firms. In this way, the ABC standard
helps distinguish regular gig workers from genuine small business owners.
Finally, ABC’s “separate business” prong asks courts to look beyond
certain theoretical opportunities for entrepreneurship that gig work may present. Thus, judges who assess the economic autonomy of workers must differentiate between genuine entrepreneurship and instances of potential entrepreneurship that platforms espouse.243 As an example of theoretical entrepreneurship, on-demand firms frequently point to their terms of service, which
often allow individuals to work for competitors or hire their own subcontractors.244 For instance, Uber allows drivers to hire subcontractors, but only if
the platform first vets and authorizes these subcontractors.245 Similarly,
Handy allows its “Service Professionals” to hire “helpers,” but only after the
helpers complete a “basic background check satisfactory to Handy.”246 Applied to these instances of potential entrepreneurship, a measure of genuine
entrepreneurship would assess whether workers act upon these contractual
freedoms. Thus, if a platform driver actually employs her own bevy of subcontractors, she is more like a separate business. Likewise, if she works for
multiple apps, advertises her services, and develops her own client base, she
is more like a small business owner. In contrast, if she simply works longer
hours for multiple platforms, she is more like an ordinary employee who
merely holds down multiple jobs.
Increasingly, courts and commentators have recognized this distinction
between theoretical and actual entrepreneurship. For example, the new Restatement of Employment Law describes the “independent businessperson”
as an “individual [who] in his or her own interest exercises entrepreneurial
241. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Agency Law and the New Economy, 72 BUS. LAW.
1009, 1040 (2017) (explaining how independent businesses promote themselves to potential
customers).
242. TaskRabbit Support, What Types of Tasks Can I Do as a Tasker?, TASKRABBIT,
https://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/en-us/articles/204411080-What-Types-of-Tasks-Can-I-Doas-a-Tasker- [https://perma.cc/3VFS-TZZM].
243. See Dubal, Wage Slave, supra note 10, at 94 (examining a variation of the “entrepreneurial potential” test).
244. See generally Lao, supra note 36, at 1552-53 (discussing the tradeoffs of freedom
and risk that come with platform work).
245. See Haan, supra note 20, at 15 (examining workers’ ability to subcontract in the
platform economy).
246. Service Professional Agreement, HANDY TECHS., INC. (Dec. 14, 2018),
https://www.handy.com/pro_terms [https://perma.cc/VW7Y-7RCV].
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control over important business decisions . . . .”247 Likewise, the Dynamex
decision stated, “The fact that a company has not prohibited or prevented a
worker from engaging in such a business is not sufficient to establish that the
worker has independently made the decision to go into business for himself
or herself.”248 Just as a part-time cook’s ability to moonlight for a competitor
does not transform the cook into a small business owner, a gig worker’s freedom to hire subcontractors or to work for other platforms does not necessarily
constitute an opportunity for genuine entrepreneurial advancement. In essence, the “separate business” analysis helps determine whether platforms
actually harness the entrepreneurship of workers who download their apps.249
3. Free from Control
The ABC standard vests courts with discretion to assess the level of
control that platforms retain over workers. Mirroring the common law test,
this prong of the ABC standard evaluates the “control and direction of the
hiring entity in the performance of the work . . . .”250 As demonstrated by
recent disputes over platform work, however, this factor often fails to provide
definitive answers because the control factor can cut both ways. For example,
although gig workers enjoy certain freedoms in determining their working
hours, platforms often control workers’ pay and subject them to specific performance expectations.251 Given the inconclusive nature of the control analysis, the Dynamex decision noted that “a court is free to consider the separate
parts of the ABC test in whatever order it chooses.”252 Because the ABC
standard is an element-based test and not a balancing standard, a platform
cannot classify its workers as independent contractors if it fails to prove any
part of the test. As such, the ABC standard authorizes judges to forego an
indeterminate control analysis if other aspects of the test provide clearer paths
to resolution.
Still, control has long been the dominant factor in misclassification analyses, and courts are unlikely to ignore this factor altogether.253 As such, certain guidelines can assist judges with evaluating the level of freedom that gig
247. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2015)
(emphasis added); see also Sunshine, supra note 128, at 129-30 (discussing the relationship
between entrepreneurship and control).
248. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 39 (Cal. 2018).
249. See Dubal, Wage Slave, supra note 10, at 122 (distinguishing between “entrepreneurial potential” and “entrepreneurial realization”).
250. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 36.
251. See supra Section I.C.1 (explaining why judges initially rejected the concept of
platform exceptionalism).
252. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 40.
253. See Carlson, supra note 85, at 314 (examining the importance of the control analysis in most employment determinations).
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workers actually enjoy. For example, although instances of direct influence
over workers can signify control, on-demand firms can also control workers
by retaining the right to exert such influence, even if platforms do not actually act upon that right.254 In addition, platforms can control workers through
indirect methods of assessment that meaningfully influence the conditions of
on-demand work.255
The forms of control that firms retain over workers vary widely from
platform to platform. For instance, Uber and Lyft impose specific service
rules on drivers, unilaterally announce prices, and subject poorly performing
drivers to deactivation.256 These platforms monitor how long it takes drivers
to accept ride requests and the rate at which they cancel accepted requests.257
Still, drivers retain control over their schedule and total hours.258 But firms
retain some influence over these decisions as well. For example, ride-hailing
apps use dynamic pricing to affect an individual’s decision about when and
where to drive.259 Uber unilaterally dictates the times and locations of “surge
pricing” and does not tell drivers the precise rates that they might earn. In
this way, the platform relies upon information asymmetries to constrain the
universe of choices available to drivers.260
But some platforms in other sectors of the gig economy retain less control over workers. Unlike Uber, Lyft, and Grubhub, many platforms do not
dictate prices.261 For instance, the chore platform TaskRabbit does not tell
taskers how much they should charge for a job or whether to take a job at all.
Taskers set their own rates and then submit invoices once they have completed a task.262 But even here, taskers do not experience completely unen-

254. See Das Acevedo, supra note 12, at 819-22 (discussing the role that retained control plays in platform work).
255. See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment
in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1727 (2016) (outlining control’s various subjects and delivery methods).
256. See Lao, supra note 36, at 1555-56 (discussing worker autonomy in the gig economy).
257. See Das Acevedo, supra note 12, at 815 (evaluating the supposed freedoms that
ride-hailing drivers enjoy).
258. See Lao, supra note 36, at 1555-56 (examining certain tradeoffs that come with
gig work).
259. See Das Acevedo, supra note 12, at 815-16 (examining the influence that platforms exert over workers).
260. See Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 6, at 1661-62 (describing the “heat maps” that
the Uber app displays to indicate surge pricing).
261. See Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm?, supra note 29, at 26 (examining
platform work and control).
262. See Malin, supra note 11, at 383 (taking a skeptical view of the idea that TaskRabbit shares an employment relationship with taskers); Means, supra note 35, at 1540-41 (comparing the business models of platforms such as TaskRabbit and Upwork).
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cumbered decision-making. As with other platforms, TaskRabbit tracks customer ratings and sets the commission that the platform takes from every
transaction. For taskers who perform poorly, the app utilizes a matching algorithm that can result in low-quality assignments or infrequent work.263
The control analysis appears even murkier for crowdworkers who perform tasks on platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. Seeming to enjoy
tremendous freedoms, Turkers can survey the prices that requesters will pay
before they commit to performing any particular job. But a crowdworker’s
freedoms diminish once work begins. For instance, requesters retain discretion to refuse payment for completed tasks. Evidence of an unpaid job can
lower a Turker’s ratings, which can functionally impair the person’s future
work opportunities.264 In addition to the contingent nature of payment, certain crowdwork platforms monitor their workers’ performance through
“time-on-task” software programs.265 For example, the platform Freelancer
measures workers’ keystrokes and takes screenshots of workers’ devices to
ensure the accuracy of their bills.266 Faced with uncertain payments, customer
reviews, and invasive monitoring, many crowdworkers enjoy less autonomy
than initial appearances might suggest.
As demonstrated by the conflicting outcomes of misclassification disputes, courts cannot always detect the influence that platforms exert over
workers.267 In contrast to more traditional job settings, where supervisors dictate commands to subordinates, on-demand firms exert control in less obvious ways.268 For instance, platforms may use an algorithm rather than a human decisionmaker to deactivate workers. The supervisors of platform work
are deputized customers who review individuals through online ratings.
Workers may be unaware of undisclosed rules embedded in software programs that determine their fate based on customer reviews or acceptance
rates.269 Given their unrevealed nature, these standards constitute instances

263. See Tippett, supra note 68, at 298 (outlining the effect that algorithms have on
worker autonomy).
264. See De Stefano, supra note 74, at 492-93 (examining the control that firms retain
over crowdworkers).
265. See Tippett, supra note 68, at 295 (comparing the experience of crowdworkers to
on-demand drivers).
266. See Brishen Rogers, Fissuring, Data-Driven Governance, and Platform Economy
Labor Standards, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 304,
307 (Nestor M. Davidson et al. eds., 2018) (outlining information asymmetries in the gig
economy).
267. See supra Section I.C (summarizing differing views of app work among courts).
268. See Das Acevedo, supra note 12, at 816 (outlining the diverse forms of control
associated with platform work).
269. See Tippett, supra note 68, at 299 (examining various systems for supervising gig
workers).
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of invisible control that platforms retain.270 In sum, whether platforms dictate
payment terms, set specific performance objectives, monitor workers’ performance, solicit customer feedback, or deactivate accounts, numerous forms
of control can operate in the background of platform work.
B. RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY GIG LITIGATION IN LIGHT OF THE ABC TEST

The standard judicial practice of balancing multiple employment factors
has hindered courts’ ability to assess the financial self-determination of
workers. This section reconsiders recent misclassification decisions from the
gig economy in light of the ABC test. It explains how, in comparison to other
employment tests, the ABC standard provides a more effective mechanism
for scrutinizing the nonemployee designations of gig workers.
Consider the case of Lawson v. Grubhub. Raef Lawson worked as a
meal delivery driver in Southern California for the platform Grubhub.271
Evaluating Lawson’s wage claims in light of a modified control test, the court
acknowledged the central role that the plaintiff’s work played in Grubhub’s
business model by stating that “delivery . . . is key to Grubhub’s continued
growth . . . .”272 Recall that the Dynamex decision began its application of the
ABC test with a simple query: Is the worker engaged in the hiring entity’s
usual business?273 Had the Lawson court applied this same standard, the
plaintiff would have prevailed because he delivered food for Grubhub—the
company’s main productive activity.274
But as with most gig misclassification cases, the court instead evaluated
Grubhub’s control over the driver.275 Explaining how the plaintiff determined
his own hours, transportation method, appearance, and delivery route, the
Lawson court found that Grubhub extended many freedoms to the driver. Yet
the plaintiff in Lawson was not completely free to perform his job. For example, the platform unilaterally determined his compensation rates and the
fees that customers paid.276 Nevertheless, the court ruled for Grubhub, holding that the control analysis tipped significantly in the platform’s favor.277
The Lawson decision illustrates how current employment standards fail
to fully assess the economic autonomy of workers. The delivery driver in

270. See id. (discussing the protocols of gig work).
271. Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d. 1071, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
272. Id. at 1090.
273. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 44 (Cal. 2018).
274. See Tomassetti, Does Uber Redefine the Firm?, supra note 29, at 5 (describing
the common expectation that a firm’s business identity should relate to its performance of
primary productive activities).
275. Lawson, 302 F. Supp. 3d. at 1093.
276. Id. at 1075.
277. Id. at 1092.
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Lawson did not remotely resemble the kind of economically secure businessperson that courts envisioned when they crafted the independent contractor
exclusion; he “worked multiple low-wage jobs in addition to his nascent acting career.”278 The plaintiff had no say over his wages: Grubhub paid him
anywhere from $9 to $15 per hour, at its discretion.279 He could not start his
own food delivery business or hire his own staff. As the Lawson court observed, because of “the nature of the work, the pay, and how the app works,
subcontracting was not a realistic option.”280 Most fundamentally, Mr. Lawson performed a task that was central to Grubhub’s business model: food
delivery. In essence, the ABC test could have allowed the Lawson court to
move beyond indeterminate balancing and, instead, focus on the delivery
driver’s economic autonomy.
Razak v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,281 another major employment victory
for platforms, also highlights the value of the ABC test, as compared to existing standards. In that case, Uber convinced a federal court in Pennsylvania
that its limousine drivers were independent businesspeople who had no right
to collect overtime.282 Applying the economic realities test, the Razak decision focused on the drivers’ apparent entrepreneurship. For instance, the
court explained how the plaintiffs operated their own limousine companies
and could hire “helpers” to drive for their companies.283 Seeming to mirror
the ambition of independent businesspeople, some drivers paid for their own
advertising and provided rides to outside customers without using the Uber
app.284 In light of these opportunities for economic gain and the freedom that
came with gig work, the Razak court found that the plaintiffs were independent contractors: “UberBLACK drivers bolster their earnings by managing
when, where, and how to perform their task of transporting passengers.”285
If, however, the Razak court had applied the ABC test to the drivers’
claims, the decision could have more effectively gauged the varying levels
of entrepreneurship that each plaintiff actually possessed. Whereas the ABC
test would have prompted an investigation into instances of real entrepreneurship, much of the Razak discussion failed to distinguish between the
drivers’ theoretical and actual entrepreneurial acts. For instance, although
some of the plaintiffs hired other limousine drivers to work for them, thus
278. Id. at 1089.
279. Id. at 1077.
280. Lawson, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 1084.
281. Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., CV 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
11, 2018); see also supra Section I.C.2 (examining recent judicial decisions on the status of
gig workers).
282. Razak, 2018 WL 1744467, at *18.
283. Id. at *15.
284. Id. at *17.
285. Id. at *18.
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signifying genuine entrepreneurship, the record suggested that at least one
plaintiff operated a sole proprietorship that did not employ any drivers other
than the plaintiff himself.286 Likewise, even though Uber allowed drivers to
work for competitors, the Razak court failed to specify which drivers actually
took advantage of this opportunity and enjoyed genuine entrepreneurial gains
as small business owners.287 In addition, some of the plaintiffs earned all of
their income from Uber during certain years, thus suggesting that the opportunities for entrepreneurship were illusory at best.288
Finally, because it applied the economic realities test, rather than the
ABC standard, the Razak court barely addressed the question of whether the
drivers’ work fell within Uber’s usual course of business. Even though the
decision acknowledged that “Uber drivers are an essential part of Uber’s
business as a transportation company,” this observation played virtually no
role in the outcome of the case.289 In contrast, the ABC standard would have
established Uber as the plaintiffs’ employer if limousine services were part
of UberBLACK’s regular business. By examining the connection between
the plaintiffs’ work and the defendant’s brand, the ABC test could have clarified whether the drivers were actually independent business owners or
merely employees who downloaded the Uber app.
C. OBJECTIONS AND RELATIONSHIP TO EXISTING EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS

Critics could raise several objections to the current proposal. Most fundamentally, they could argue that courts formulated existing employment
standards long ago, and that judges cannot simply abandon these factors in
favor of the ABC test. Indeed, the jurisdictions that have adopted the ABC
test have almost universally done so through the legislative processes rather
than by judicial proclamation. Aside from the Dynamex decision, there are
very few examples of courts adopting the ABC standard absent some clear
legislative directive.290
286. Id. at *15 (noting how one of the plaintiff’s companies received payments from
Uber, which the company later distributed to drivers); see also Defendants’ Revised Reply to
Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts Opposing Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 13-14,
52, 61, Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., CV 16-573 (Apr. 4, 2018) (explaining how one plaintiff
was a sole proprietor with no employees, while other plaintiffs hired drivers as subcontractors).
287. Razak, 2018 WL 1744467, at *15 (“Plaintiffs and their helpers are permitted to
work for competing companies.”).
288. See Defendants’ Revised Reply to Plaintiffs’ Statement of Facts Opposing Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 93-10, Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., CV 16-573
(Apr. 4, 2018) (discussing the income streams of various plaintiffs).
289. Razak, 2018 WL 1744467, at *19.
290. But see Hargrove v. Sleepy’s, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 459 (N.J. 2015) (adopting the
ABC test after recognizing the “failure of either the text of the [Wage Payment Law] or its

424

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39-3

Observers could further point out that the California Supreme Court
based its Dynamex decision on the state’s wage law, which broadly defines
“employ” as to “suffer or permit” work.291 Although this terminology has
“striking breadth” in the wage and hour context, it is absent from the common
law standard.292 Indeed, the Dynamex decision stated explicitly that the “suffer or permit” definition of “employ” was “broader and more inclusive than
the preexisting common law test . . . .”293
Although persuasive on their face, none of these objections should prevent courts from applying the ABC test to a variety of claims, including those
that involve the common law standard. First, many workers already sue employers under workplace statutes that define “employ” as to “suffer or permit” work. For example, most states use some version of the “suffer or permit” terminology in their wage statutes, and federal law defines “employ”
the same way for purposes of family leave, wage and hour coverage, and
agricultural worker protections.294 Although most courts that apply the “suffer or permit” language use the economic realities test,295 both the California
Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the ABC standard as the superior application of this statutory text.296 To the extent that future courts review claims that contain identical statutory language, these
cases provide a roadmap for achieving the broad remedial purpose of the
“suffer or permit” terminology.
But courts can apply the ABC test to common law claims as well. In
contrast to the current articulation of the common law standard, which contains numerous nonbinding factors, the ABC test more effectively evaluates
a worker’s economic autonomy.297 As such, the ABC standard better reflects
implementing regulations to prescribe a standard to guide the distinction between an employee
and an independent contractor”).
291. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 21 (Cal. 2018).
292. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992).
293. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 33.
294. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2018); Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §1802(5) (2018); Family and Medical Leave Act,
29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2018); see also WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, THE APPLICATION OF THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT’S “SUFFER OR PERMIT” STANDARD IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES
WHO ARE MISCLASSIFIED AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS 2 n.2 (July 15, 2015), withdrawn on
other grounds (June 7, 2017) (listing federal laws that include “suffer or permit” language);
James Reif, ‘To Suffer or Permit to Work’: Did Congress and State Legislatures Say What
They Meant and Mean What They Said?, 6 NE. U. L.J. 347, 372 (2014) (outlining “suffer or
permit” terminology in state wage statutes).
295. See Bodie, supra note 18, at 662-63 (discussing the economic realities test).
296. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 36; Hargrove v. Sleepy's, LLC, 106 A.3d 449, 465 (N.J.
2015).
297. See supra Section II.A (examining the rationales for excluding independent contractors from the doctrine of vicarious employer liability).
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the underlying reasons behind the agency test’s independent contractor exclusion.298 Even though most jurisdictions have adopted the ABC test
through legislative acts, courts still retain the authority to recast the common
law test in light of the ABC standard. Judges who currently apply the agency
standard frequently note that the test allows them to balance and weigh factors at their discretion.299 In fact, the Restatement of Agency authorizes this
adaptation by listing certain common law factors that “among others” courts
should consider.300 Likewise, the D.C. Circuit acted upon the judicial authority to reorient the common law test when it announced a new focus away
from “control” and toward “entrepreneurialism” based on this “important animating principle” of the agency standard.301 This freedom to add and remove
various prongs of the test explains why different courts and agencies have
listed five, ten, and sometimes twenty factors to articulate the common law
standard.302
Even during the early days of the common law test, courts added new
factors to the analysis in response to evolving workplace relationships.303
This adaptability makes sense in light of the vast historical ground that the
agency standard has traveled.304 Adjusting to the new challenges posed by
gig work, the common law standard can change while still enabling courts to
sort workers based on their financial self-determination. Given the test’s fluidity, nothing prevents judges from adopting the ABC standard as a more
effective articulation of common law principles.
Observers might also criticize the ABC test for its sheer breadth, as
compared to existing standards. For example, the second element of the ABC
test (i.e., performing work in the firm’s usual course of business) has the potential to encompass many individuals who currently work as independent
contractors. Take, for instance, temporary computer programmers at technology firms or physicians at hospitals. Even though many of these individuals
298. See Pearce & Silva, supra note 23, at 27 (calling the ABC standard a “simplified
version” of the common law test).
299. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 512 (discussing the freedom that courts have to consider different employment factors).
300. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
301. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see generally Bodie, supra note 18, at 663 (asserting that the control test “may be losing its firm grip”
on the definition of employment).
302. See Dubal, Wage Slave, supra note 10, at 77-78 (discussing the Internal Revenue
Service’s twenty-factor test); Sunshine, supra note 128, at 116-17 (examining different variations of the common law test).
303. See Carlson, supra note 85, at 310 (explaining how early employment decisions
added factors based on the changing circumstances of work).
304. See generally Carlson, Employment by Design, supra note 47, at 158-59 (discussing the connection between employment law and master-servant law); Lee, supra note 127, at
786-87 (examining the origins of the common law test).
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work as independent contractors, they would become employees under the
ABC test because their work falls squarely within the hiring company’s usual
course of business. As such, the ABC test might include economically autonomous individuals who actually possess the attributes of real independent
contractors.
But the ABC standard’s extensive reach represents a feature of the test,
not a bug. As discussed above, many individuals who currently work under
nonemployee designations bear little resemblance to the financially autonomous independent contractors of agency law.305 Certainly, the ABC test
could theoretically cover individuals who possess a high level of economic
power. But courts and legislatures can solve this problem of overbreadth in
many ways. First, judges have applied the ABC standard to the unemployment arena for over eighty years. This extensive precedent suggests that
courts have found ways to implement the ABC test without destroying industries or encompassing all workers in the process. Second, even if judges
apply the ABC standard to a broader class of workers, lawmakers can always
exclude certain groups or industries through legislation. As California’s current experience with the Dynamex decision demonstrates, businesses are
quite capable of lobbying lawmakers for exemptions from the ABC test based
on the perceived financial independence of certain workers.306 Likewise, legislatures in other circumstances have repeatedly shown an ability to create
carveouts for individuals who work casually or infrequently.307 If certain
platform workers genuinely benefit from the entrepreneurship of their
nonemployee designations, then lawmakers can exercise their power to exclude these workers from the ABC standard. Finally, given the ongoing problem of worker misclassification and the perception that gig firms have
“hacked” employment laws,308 adopting a mechanism for broadly extending
employment protections to more workers represents a vastly superior alternative to the status quo’s movement toward exclusion.
CONCLUSION
The platform economy seems to grant workers tremendous freedoms.
With the swipe of a phone, they can decide when to work, whom to work for,
305. See supra Section II.B (discussing the mismatch between agency goals and contemporary contractor designations).
306. See Roosevelt, supra note 211 (summarizing efforts by California’s business
lobby to obtain exemptions from Dynamex).
307. See generally Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, A Critical Examination of a
Third Employment Category for On-Demand Work, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF THE SHARING ECONOMY 316, 327 (Nestor M. Davidson et al. eds., 2018) (outlining
the different levels of engagement that workers have with platforms); Rogers, supra note 1, at
515 (summarizing legislative efforts to classify specific groups of workers).
308. See Alexander & Tippett, supra note 57, at 1011-12 (discussing the “avoidance
hacks” of platforms).
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or whether to work at all. Based on this apparent freedom, some courts and
legislatures have allowed platforms to operate in a legal zone that exists outside the realm of employment law. Applied on a grand scale, the entire project of on-demand labor threatens to destabilize our contemporary understanding of employment law.
But the touted freedoms of gig work are often overstated. For example,
many platforms unilaterally set their workers’ pay, monitor their performance, and decide when to deactivate them. Amid these debates over the real
or imagined freedoms of platform work, judges should return to first principles and determine whether gig workers actually possess the financial selfdetermination of bona fine independent contractors.
For those firms that merely provide software and unencumbered earning
opportunities to workers, the ABC test will not alter their business models.
In contrast, a shift to the ABC standard will extend workplace protections to
non-entrepreneurial workers who are engaged in a platform’s ordinary course
of business. By sorting workers based on their economic autonomy, courts
can more effectively distinguish between normal gig employees and the genuine independent contractors of platform work.

